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""FRONT-RUNNING"-INSIDER TRADING
UNDER THE COMMODITY
EXCHANGE ACT
Jerry W. Markham*
On "Black Monday," October 19, 1987, "perhaps the worst day in the
history of U.S. equity markets," the Dow Jones Industrial Average fell by
508 points, representing a loss of approximately $1 trillion' in the value of
all outstanding United States stocks. In the wake of the crash, numerous
studies were conducted and reports published in which a host of regulatory
issues were considered,2 including a disturbing phenomenon called "front-
running."3
* B.S., 1969, Western Kentucky University; J.D., 1971, University of Kentucky College
of Law; LL.M., 1974, Georgetown University. Mr. Markham is a partner in the Washington,
D.C. office of Rogers & Wells. He was previously Chief Counsel of the Enforcement Division
of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission; Secretary and Counsel for the Chicago
Board Options Exchange; and an attorney at the Securities and Exchange Commission. He is
also an Adjunct Professor at Georgetown University Law Center, where he teaches commodi-
ties regulation.
1. REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE ON MARKET MECHANISMS 1, 36 (Jan.
1988) [hereinafter BRADY REPORT].
2. Id.; N. KATZENBACH, AN OVERVIEW OF PROGRAM TRADING AND ITS IMPACT ON
CURRENT MARKET PRACTICES, A STUDY COMMISSIONED BY THE NEW YORK STOCK Ex-
CHANGE (NYSE) (Dec. 21, 1987) [hereinafter NYSE REPORT]; M. MILLER, J. HAWKE, B.
MALKIEL & M. SCHOLES, PRELIMINARY REPORT OF THE COMMIrrTEE OF INQUIRY AP-
POINTED BY THE CHICAGO MERCANTILE EXCHANGE (CME) TO EXAMINE EVENTS SUR-
ROUNDING OCTOBER 19, 1987 (Dec. 22, 1987) [hereinafter CME REPORT]; DIVISION OF
TRADING AND MARKETS, COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION (CFTC), ANALYSIS
OF TRADING IN THE CHICAGO BOARD OF TRADE'S MAJOR MARKET INDEX FUTURES CON-
TRACT ON OCTOBER 20, 1987 (Jan. 4, 1988); Division of Economic Analysis and Division of
Trading and Markets, CFTC, Interim Report on Stock Index Futures and Cash Market Activity
During October 1987 to the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, 2 Comm. Fut. L.
Rep. (CCH) 23,969 (Nov. 9, 1987); DIVISION OF TRADING AND MARKETS, CFTC, FOL-
LOW-UP REPORT ON FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT OF STOCK INDEX FUTURES MARKETS DURING
OCTOBER 1987 (Jan. 6, 1988); GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FINANCIAL MARKETS: PRE-
LIMINARY OBSERVATIONS ON THE OCTOBER 1987 CRASH (Jan. 1988) [hereinafter GAO RE-
PORT]; REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL STOCK EXCHANGE, QUALITY OF MARKETS
QUARTERLY (Winter 1987-1988); REPORT OF THE FINANCIAL MARKETS AND INSTITUTIONS
DIVISION OF THE BANK OF ENGLAND (1988).
3. SECURITIES EXCHANGE COMMISSION (SEC) STAFF REPORT, THE OCTOBER 1987
MARKET BREAK (Feb. 11, 1988) [hereinafter SEC REPORT]; DIVISION OF ECONOMIC ANALY-
SIS AND DIVISION OF TRADING AND MARKETS, CFTC, FINAL REPORT ON STOCK INDEX
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Simply stated, the practice of front-running involves a transaction in a
commodity futures contract 4 or a stock option contract 5 by a trader with
"material" nonpublic information concerning a "block" transaction6 in the
AND CASH MARKET ACTIVITY DURING OCTOBER 1987 TO THE COMMODITY FUTURES
TRADING COMMISSION (Jan. 1988) [hereinafter CFTC FINAL REPORT].
4. A commodity futures contract is simply an obligation on the part of the purchaser
(the "long") to take delivery of a specified amount of a specified grade and quantity of a
commodity at a specified date in the future. Conversely, the seller (the "short") is required to
make delivery on the contract. Commodity futures contract terms, however, are standardized
so that the traders may close out their positions at any time before delivery by entering into
offsetting obligations. When this occurs, the futures contracts are liquidated and the trader
will have an overall gain or loss from the transaction. See generally Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 357-60 (1982); British American Commodity
Options Corp. v. Bagley, 552 F.2d 482, 484-485 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 938 (1977);
Cargill Inc. v. Hardin, 452 F.2d 1154, 1156-57 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 932
(1972); S. REP. No. 850, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 128 (1978); CHICAGO BOARD OF TRADE, COM-
MODITY TRADING MANUAL 8 (1973); M. MAYER, MARKETS, cxiv-xxv (1988). Some futures
contracts are settled by cash settlement rather than delivery of the underlying commodity.
Even where actual delivery is provided for, however, deliveries are taken in only about 3% of
all futures transactions. See Curran, 456 U.S. at 359 n.9; see also Hardin, 452 F.2d at 1156 n.2.
Futures contracts are traded on margin. An initial margin must be posted when the cus-
tomer opens a futures contract. This is usually a small percentage of the contract price.
Thereafter, additional margin must be posted each day there is an adverse movement in the
futures contract that causes one trader or the other to suffer a loss. Margin for futures con-
tracts is distinguished from margin for securities. In the latter case, margin means simply a
limitation on extensions of credit for purchases of the stock, while margin for futures contracts
refers to a good faith deposit on the value of the contract so as to assure performance. See
generally Katara v. D.E. Jones Commodities, Inc., 835 F.2d 966 (2d Cir. 1987); CHICAGO
BOARD OF TRADE, COMMODITY TRADING MANUAL 10 (1982); Corcoran & Ervin, Mainte-
nance of Market Strategies in Futures Broker Insolvencies: Futures Position Transfers from
Troubled Firms, 44 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 849, 854 n.28 (1987); Rogers & Markham, The
Application of West German Statutes to United States Commodity Futures Contracts: An Un-
necessary Clash of Policies, 19 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 273, 275 (1987).
5. In brief, a "call" stock option permits investors to pay a fee or "premium" for the
right to purchase a specified number of shares of a given security, such as IBM, at an agreed
upon "strike" price. This option right is limited in duration, and the option is standardized so
that contracts can be offset in the event that the purchaser of the option wishes to liquidate the
option position, rather than to exercise the option and purchase the underlying security. Simi-
larly, a put option allows the purchaser to sell or "put" securities to the writer of the option at
a specified price, even if the value of the securities decline below that price. Stock options are
traded over-the-counter and on securities exchanges where they may be offset, much like a
futures contract. Options on commodities and options on futures contracts are traded on fu-
tures exchanges. See Markham & Gilberg, Stock and Commodity Options-Two Regulatory
Approaches and Their Conflicts, 47 ALB. L. REV. 741, 742-43 (1983). See generally T. Russo,
REGULATIONS OF THE COMMODITIES FUTURES AND OPTIONS MARKETS, § 1.01 (1983); Se-
ligman, The Structure of the Options Market, 10 J. CORP. L. 141 (1984).
6. A block trade has been defined as follows:
Block In the stock market, a large number of shares to sell; today, conventionally,
10,000 or more. Blocks may be inconvenient to sell in the course of an auction mar-
ket, because the heavy supply presses the price down. Brokers for the holder of the
block (usually some fund or institution) thus try to sell it away from the market, over
[Vol. 38:69
Front-Running
commodity or security underlying the futures or options contract.7 To be
material, the block transaction must be of such a size that it will cause a
price change in the futures or options contract and thereby allow the front-
runner to profit from the offsetting options or futures position.'
In actuality, front-running is more complex than this definition suggests.
It encompasses at least three forms of conduct, each of which raises different
regulatory and policy issues.9 They are: (1) trading by third parties who are
tipped on an impending block trade ("tippee" trading); (2) transactions in
which the owner or purchaser of the block trade itself engages in the offset-
ting futures or options transaction as a means of "hedging" against price
fluctuations caused by the block transaction ("self-front-running"); 1° and
(3) transactions where a broker with knowledge of an impending customer
block order trades ahead of that order for the broker's own profit ("trading
ahead").
This Article will explore the background of front-running, and its regula-
tion in the securities industry. The Article will then focus on the spread of
the practice to the commodity futures industry and the regulatory and policy
issues raised by various forms of front-running. It will then address whether
the present statutory framework is adequate to prohibit undesirable front-
running practices. The Article proposes legislation to restrict such practices,
and identifies surveillance methods that are needed to detect violations of
necessary restrictions.
the telephone, to known possible large customers. If the stock sells, the broker is
usually paid commissions on both the buy and the sell side. Large brokerage firms
will often complete such deals by purchasing a part of the block for themselves,
Positioning it until another purchaser can be found. When blocks listed on a U.S.
stock exchange are sold in this manner, brokers who are members of the exchange
must bring the transaction to the attention of the Market Maker at the exchange, and
cause the sale to be published on the ticker tape or the computer screen like the sales
accomplished by normal bidding in the open market.
A block already traded upstairs and carried to the exchange floor as a done deal is
said to be CROSSED. If all the shares have been bought by public customers, rather
than the broker himself, it is a "clean cross."
M. MAYER, supra note 4, at 282.
7. See generally Securities Exchange Act Release No. 14,156, 13 SEC DKT. 661 (Nov. 9,
1977) (a discussion of the possible prohibition of front-running).
8. Raisler, Identifying and Controlling "Frontrunning, " FIA Rev., July/Aug. 1988, at 9.
9. Id. at 5-6.
10. Id. The concept of hedging entails a producer or processor of the commodity underly-
ing the futures contract taking an offsetting position in the futures market. For example, a
"farmer who takes a 'short' position in the futures market is protected against a price decline; a
processor who takes a 'long' position is protected against a price increase." Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 358 (1982); see also T. HIERONYMUS,
ECONOMICS OF FUTURES TRADING 107-08 (2d ed. 1977) (providing a brief definition and
example of hedging).
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I. EMERGENCE OF FRONT-RUNNING ON SECURITIES
OPTIONS MARKETS
The practice of front-running first appeared on the Chicago Board Op-
tions Exchange (CBOE), the world's first and largest organized stock op-
tions exchange.'" The CBOE was created by the Chicago Board of Trade to
apply commodity futures trading principles to securities transactions. 12 This
resulted in some regulatory confusion because trading in commodity option
and futures contracts was regulated, under the Commodity Exchange Act,13
by an agency in the Department of Agriculture, while securities and tradi-
tional stock options were regulated by the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion (SEC) under the federal securities laws.' 4 This situation was
compounded by the fact that, originally, regulation of options trading under
the Commodity Exchange Act applied exclusively to options on certain agri-
cultural commodities.' 5 The Commodity Exchange Act barred options
trading only on those commodities.' 6 On the other hand, the federal securi-
ties laws did contain a provision that allowed the SEC to regulate trading in
stock options, trading which was then being conducted in the over-the-
counter market.' 7 It was unclear, however, whether the SEC, or any other
regulatory agency, had authority to regulate trading in options in other ar-
eas, such as an option on a security traded on a futures exchange.'" Conse-
11. See generally SECURITIES EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 96TH CONG., 1ST SESS., REPORT
OF THE SPECIAL STUDY OF THE OPTIONS MARKETS TO THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION 183-189 (Comm. Print 1978) [hereinafter SEC OPTIONS STUDY] (discusses defi-
nition of front-running and early exchange responses).
12. Board of Trade of Chicago v. S.E.C., 677 F.2d 1137, 1140 n.2 (7th Cir.), vacated as
moot sub nom. Chicago Bd. of Options Exchange, Inc. v. Board of Trade of Chicago, 459 U.S.
1026 (1982); 2 ROBERT NATHAN ASSOCS., INC., PUBLIC POLICY ASPECTS OF A FUTURES-
TYPE MARKET IN OPTIONS ON SECURITIES, PREPARED FOR THE CHICAGO BOARD OF TRADE
(Nov. 1969) [hereinafter NATHAN STUDY].
13. 7 U.S.C. §§ 2-26 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). See generally Rainbolt, Regulating the
Grain Gambler and His Successors, 6 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1 (1977).
14. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a, 78a-kk (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
15. See Rainbolt, supra note 13, at 10-12.
16. 7 U.S.C. §§ 2, 6c(b), (c) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
17. 15 U.S.C. § 78i (1982).
18. In the early 1970s, options traded on commodities not regulated under the Commod-
ity Exchange Act became a popular investment. Several firms sold these instruments, often
without having any underlying commodity to back them. Numerous sales practice abuses also
occurred in which "boiler room" operations were conducted to sell these instruments nation-
wide to unsophisticated investors. Although its jurisdiction was unclear, the SEC stepped in
and charged that these unregulated commodity options were in fact securities that had to be
registered with the SEC. See, e.g., SEC v. Goldstein, Samuelson, Inc., 1972-1973 Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 93,800 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 1973) (summary of complaint); see also SEC v. Sav-
age, 513 F.2d 188, 189 (7th Cir. 1975); Long, Commodity Options-Revisited, 25 DRAKE L.
REV. 75, 78-79 (1975); Lower, The Regulation of Commodity Options, 1978 DUKE L.J. 1095,
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quently, the manner in which the CBOE would be regulated was uncertain.
Rather than confront that issue, however, the Chicago Board of Trade regis-
tered the CBOE as a national securities exchange subject to SEC
regulation.' 9
As a part of its development efforts for the CBOE, the Chicago Board of
Trade commissioned a study by Robert R. Nathan Associates, Inc. (Nathan
Study).2 ° Among other things, the study considered the possibility that
CBOE options could be used by large block traders to avoid price pressures
from their trading. It had been suggested that institutional investors and
other large traders could use such options to hedge against changes in stock
prices caused by their large block transactions. The Nathan Study, however,
concluded that there was a great deal of over-optimism as to the extent to
which an options exchange would allow institutional investors to reduce the
difficulties and costs of engaging in large block trading. The study noted
that there had been suggestions that options could be used to distribute or
accumulate large block positions in a stock without causing a market
break.2 These statements, however, were thought to exaggerate the amount
of price pressure caused by large block transactions, except possibly in thin
markets. The Nathan Study expressed the view that organized options trad-
ings would not solve the latter problem because exchange-traded options
would primarily involve highly liquid common stocks.2 2
1105-08; Markham & Gilberg, supra note 5, at 759-61; Schobel & Markham, Commodity Op-
tions-A New Industry or Another Debacle?, Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 347 (April 7,
1976) (Special Supplement).
Despite these efforts, Congress thereafter concluded that trading in commodity options was
poorly regulated, and that legislation was needed to resolve the confusion in court decisions as
to the traditional definitions of commodities and securities. H.R. REP. No. 975, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. 48 (1974); 120 CONG. REC. 34,736 (1974) (remarks of Rep. Poage); 120 CONG. REc.
30,458-59 (1974) (statement of Sen. Talmadge). Consequently, in 1974, Congress created the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission and granted it exclusive jurisdiction over all trading
in commodity options. Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974, Pub. L. No.
93-463, 88 Stat. 1389 (1974) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.). See gener-
ally Chicago Bd. of Trade v. SEC, 677 F.2d 1137, 1140 n.2 (7th Cir.), vacated as moot sub
nom. Chicago Bd. of Options Exchange, Inc. v. Chicago Bd. of Trade, 459 U.S. 1026 (1982).
19. See Chicago Bd. of Trade, 677 F.2d at 1140 n.2.
20. NATHAN STUDY, supra note 12.
21. Id. at 48-51.
22. Specifically, the Nathan Study stated that:
[There] appears to be a good deal of misunderstanding about the extent to which an
organized option market would permit institutional investors to overcome what they
regard as some of the difficulties and costs of large-block trading in equities. Many
references are made.., for example, to the use of puts and calls for distributing or
accumulating large positions in a particular stock without breaking the market.
These statements appear to rest among other things on a gross exaggeration of the
amount of "price pressure" involved in large transactions even under existing institu-
tional arrangements .... Admittedly, market thinness and price pressure may well
1988]
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Some three years after this report, the CBOE began trading in stock op-
tions.23 It was an almost immediate success and was quickly copied by other
exchanges.24 Initially, as predicted by the Nathan Study, trading by institu-
tional customers and large block traders did not raise concerns on the CBOE
because they accounted for only between five and ten percent of total cus-
tomer activity. 25 This limited institutional use was due to concern that the
CBOE could not handle orders of block size. In addition, unresolved ques-
tions regarding the regulatory dimensions of use of the CBOE by various
institutions and the tax consequences of options transactions restrained insti-
tutional trading. Nevertheless, the CBOE reported early in its existence that
"members ha[d] reported receiving and being able to execute within a single
day's trading a number of orders to buy or sell 100 or more options con-
tracts, (representing options on 10,000 or more shares [of securities])." 26
The CBOE was subsequently able to remove several impediments to insti-
tutional trading. Liquidity and institutional participation increased substan-
tially as volume virtually exploded.27 With increased volume and liquidity,
a number of abuses developed in connection with listed options trading. One
such abuse was "front-running," which the SEC in 1977 identified as:
[T]he practice of trading a security while in possession of unre-
ported information concerning a block transaction in the same or a
related security. Because of the derivative nature of the pricing of
be much more serious problems for unlisted stocks... [but] [o]rganized option trad-
ing will have to be concentrated in a few of the most widely known and actively
traded common stocks to maintain the high degree of liquidity promised by the
Board for the option market. The liquidity of a particular option, moreover, is not
something that is determined completely independently of the factors determining
the liquidity of the underlying share. If a stock is so little known and so narrowly
held that sellers could not be found quickly for 10,000 of its shares without blowing
up the price, what reason is there to believe that the buyer could obtain calls for
10,000 shares without bidding up the market for calls (or for shares too, as the writ-
ers scramble to cover their positions)?
Id. at 48-49.
23. See CHICAGO BOARD OPTIONS EXCHANGE (CBOE): THE FIRST THREE MONTHS 5
(1973) [hereinafter CBOE: FIRST THREE MONTHS].
24. Within a year after the CBOE's initial trading, four other securities exchanges an-
nounced plans for the development of exchange-traded option markets. See CHICAGO BOARD
OPTIONS EXCHANGE 1973 ANNUAL REPORT 3 (1973).
25. CBOE: FIRST THREE MONTHS, supra note 23, at 34-35.
26. Id. at 35.
27. See SEC OPTIONS STUDY, supra note 11, at 165-68. Volume in exchange-traded op-
tions contracts increased from the 911 contracts traded by the CBOE on the day it opened in
April 1973 to over 3.3 million contracts per week on all exchanges in 1983. See CBOE: FIRST
THREE MONTHS, supra note 23, at 7, app. 7; CHICAGO BOARD OPTIONS EXCHANGE 1973
ANNUAL REPORT 1 (1973); Seligman, supra note 5, at 147. The total combined volume of the
options exchanges exceeded 287 million contracts in 1986. SEC REPORT, supra note 3, at 8.
[Vol. 38:69
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options .... [front-running] is usually associated with the trading
of options based upon knowledge of an unreported block transac-
tion in the underlying security which presents an opportunity to
take an options position at a more favorable premium than would
be available immediately after the publication of the block transac-
tion. The knowledge may relate to a transaction which has not
been finally agreed to but which in the relevant circumstances is
nonetheless almost certain to go through, or it may relate to a
transaction which has been consummated, but not yet reported.28
To stop this practice, in 1977 the CBOE proposed rule 4.18, a new ex-
change rule that would have prohibited trading in "options with knowledge
of a block transaction in an underlying security or .... [conversely,] trading
[in the] underlying security with knowledge of a block transaction in...
option[s] ... on the [security], prior to the time information as to the block
[became] publicly available."29 Proposed rule 4.18 would have prohibited
such trading for a proprietary or discretionary account of a member, or per-
son associated with a member, "after the terms of the relevant block transac-
tion had been agreed to by all parties to that transaction."30 A block was
defined by the proposed rule as 10,000 or more shares or options covering
that number of shares.31
The proposed rule was submitted to the SEC pursuant to rule 19b-4,
promulgated under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,32 which required
SEC approval of exchange rules. Thereafter, in a letter to the CBOE dated
November 9, 1977, the SEC expressed approval of the CBOE's effort to re-
strict this practice, stating that "it seems evident that such behavior on the
part of persons with knowledge of imminent transactions which will likely
affect the price of the derivative security constitutes an unfair use of such
knowledge." 3 The SEC, however, was critical of the limited scope of the
CBOE's proposed rule, and expressed the view that several modifications
were necessary before it could approve adoption of the new rule. For exam-
ple, the rule proposed "that knowledge of an individual within a member
organization should not be imputed to the organization or to other individu-
als."3 The SEC believed that this limitation was, "unwarranted and raised
fundamental questions as to the proposed rule's effectiveness." ' 35 In addi-
28. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 14,156, 13 SEC DKT. No. 661 (Nov. 9, 1977).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b) (1982); 17 C.F.R. § 240.19b-4 (1988).
33. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 14,156, supra note 28, at 661.
34. Id. at 663.
35. Id.
1988]
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tion, it found that the proposed rule failed to prohibit front-running for the
accounts of customers tipped by a CBOE member on a forthcoming block
trade. The SEC also asserted that the rule should apply to blocks of less
than 10,000 shares. The SEC additionally recommended that the CBOE
publish examples of front-running activities that would violate the proposed
rule so as to make clear its prohibitions.
3 6
The SEC stated that front-running may constitute violations of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934 and that it could take enforcement action itself.
37
The SEC also believed that existing CBOE rule 4.1 already prohibited front-
running because such transactions were inconsistent with the just and equi-
table principles of trade standards already contained in that rule.38
In response to the SEC's criticism, the CBOE withdrew its proposed
front-running rule.39 Instead, it issued an educational circular for its mem-
bers asserting, as suggested by the SEC, that front-running violated existing
CBOE rule 4.1 which prohibited conduct by members inconsistent with just
and equitable principles of trade.' The circular gave examples of front-run-
ning. Among other things, it noted that tipping a customer of an impending
block trade could be a violation of exchange rules.4 1 The circular stated,
again reflecting the SEC's comments, that transactions of over 10,000 shares
are conclusively deemed to be blocks and that transactions of less than
10,000 shares may be deemed to blocks in appropriate cases.42 The circular
stated that front-running would include knowledge of less than all terms of a
block transaction, if there was knowledge that all material terms of the
transaction had or would be agreed upon. 43 Other exchanges trading securi-
ties options also subsequently published similar educational circulars on
front-running.44
At the time the CBOE was addressing front-running, the SEC was also
conducting a broad investigation of the options market (SEC Options
Study), and it later filed a voluminous report on these markets.45 Among
other things, the SEC Options Study found that the leverage offered by stock
36. Id. at 661.
37. Id. at 663.
38. Id.
39. SEC OPTIONS STUDY, supra note 11, at 187-88.
40. Regulatory Division, CBOE, Educational Circular No. 23 (Oct. 10, 1978).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. These exchanges included the NYSE, the Philadelphia Stock Exchange, the National
Association of Securities Dealers, the American Stock Exchange, and the Pacific Stock Ex-
change. See SEC REPORT, supra note 3, at 3-30 & n.81. Some broker-dealers also adopted in-
house rules prohibiting front-running. See SEC OPTIONS STUDY, supra note 11, at 186.
45. SEC OPTIONS STUDY, supra note 11.
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exchange traded options created new opportunities for trading on the basis
of nonpublic market information, including front-running.46
The SEC Options Study gave an example of front-running in which a
block positioner (i.e., a person seeking to place the sale of a large block of
stock held by an institutional investor) obtained market information con-
cerning a potential block transaction as the result of his positioning activi-
ties.47 The block positioner, aware that the forthcoming block would be
reported at less than the current market price, would write call options
before the price of the call reflected the block transaction. As a consequence,
the block positioner would receive a greater premium for the option by writ-
ing those calls before the price dropped to reflect the depressive effect the
block sale would have on the price of the stock and its related options.4
The SEC Options Study noted that the use of such market information gave
the block positioner an advantage over other market participants. The SEC
asserted that trading on such market information was "inconsistent with the
notion[s] of fair and honest markets and just and equitable principles of
trade."4 9 It noted, however, that it had not specifically considered whether
"self-front-running," front-running by the block owner, would also be incon-
sistent with such principles. The SEC acknowledged that such trading could
constitute an unfair use of such knowledge.5°
The SEC also indicated that front-running could occur even without spe-
cific information of a particular trade, such as in instances where it was
known that there was a large buyer or seller of a block in the market. The
SEC stated that front-running would occur where a firm effecting options
46. The SEC Options Study found that:
The leverage offered by options, which permits substantial percentage gains on a
small capital investment, and the existence of a liquid market for options[,] have
created new opportunities for profitable options trading based on non-public market
information. One method of taking advantage of this information is "front-running"
which the Commission has defined as the practice of trading a security while in [the]
possession of unreported information concerning a block transaction in the same or
related security. [sic].
Id. at 183.
47. Id.
48. The SEC Options Study stated that:
For example, assume XYZ stock is trading at 50 and a call option with a strike price
of 50[,] and with one or two months to expiration[,] is trading at 2. Assume further
that a block positioner, knowing that he is going to bid 49 for a block of 30,000
shares of XYZ stock, sells 300 XYZ 50 calls at 2 and subsequently executes the
equity block transaction at 49. The purchasers of the calls, however, would not have
paid $2 if they knew that a block of the underlying stock was going to trade at 49,
which would likely have caused a drop in the price of the option.
Id. at 183-84.
49. Id. at 184.
50. Id. at 184 n.75.
1988]
Catholic University Law Review
transactions had sufficient market information concerning a particular po-
tential block trade to permit it to have a material advantage over other mar-
ket participants. 51
The SEC Options Study found that the various exchanges had taken no
disciplinary actions for front-running, even though exchange surveillance
systems had detected such practices. The American Stock Exchange, for
example, had declined to institute front-running cases because it "accepted
the argument that [the] option[s] transaction[s], when executed prior to [a]
block transaction, [were] an appropriate hedging strategy by the block posi-
tioner." 52 Under this analysis, the premium from the options could legiti-
mately be used to offset, in part, the drop in market value caused by the large
block sale. Later, however, the American Stock Exchange revised its posi-
tion and concluded that it no longer viewed such front-running as appropri-
ate hedging." The SEC Options Study, however, suggested that such
hedging may have a beneficial effect on the market: "Listed option trading
may have reduced somewhat the amount of price movement associated with
stock transactions in underlying stocks because of the ability of block posi-
tioners to reduce risk by using options, although no conclusive evidence is
yet available." 54
The uncertainty on this issue was compounded even further in 1981 when
the CBOE issued a clarification of its educational circular on front-running,
indicating that CBOE members "could position the option side of a cus-
tomer's block size stock/option order with knowledge that the material
terms of the stock side of the transaction have been or will imminently be
agreed upon. The exception would also permit the positioning of the stock
side first."" The CBOE appeared tacitly to recognize that block traders did
use the options market to hedge their trades and that such self-front-running
was permissible.
Following the SEC Options Study, other stock markets, including the
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the National Association of Securi-
51. Id. at 185.
52. Id. at 186-87.
53. Id. at 186-87. The concept of hedging is discussed infra, text and accompanying notes
120-24, and note 147. See M. MAYER, supra note 4, at 285-86.
54. SEC OPTIONS STUDY, supra note 11, at 185 n.76.
55. Regulation Division, CBOE, Memorandum to all CBOE Members 1 (Dec. 22, 1981).
This memorandum, however, also stated that:
It is important to note that the execution of the stock and/or option side of a cus-
tomer's block size stock option order at prices differing significantly from those avail-
able at the time of order entry may violate just and equitable principles of trade or
other exchange rules even though front-running may not have occurred.
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ties Dealers (NASD), began trading options. They too adopted front-run-
ning prohibitions through the publication of circulars such as that used by
the CBOE.56 But options trading on the NYSE and the NASD raised par-
ticular front-running concerns on the part of the SEC because traders on
those markets sought to engage in so-called "dual" or "side-by-side" trading,
defined as trading both the options and underlying stock on the same mar-
ket.57 This gave rise to greater front-running opportunities due to the in-
creased accessibility to block transaction information. To prevent such
misconduct, certain exchanges and the SEC announced prohibitions that
proscribed trading by a member with knowledge of a block trade in the op-
tion or the security, and condemned "tippee" front-running.58
In 1982, the Philadelphia Stock Exchange adopted intermarket surveil-
lance efforts to detect front-running between currency options traded on the
exchange and cash currency in the related underlying market. 59 In 1984,
concern also arose for the first time about possible front-running of options
on stock indexes, a then relatively new and controversial product.' This
56. See, e.g., supra note 40. See generally Seligman, supra note 5 (provides an overview of
industry-wide practices).
57. Concerns arose that trading of options and the underlying security on the same ex-
changes could present a danger of misuse of "market information" concerning trading in the
stock and options. Such concerns delayed options trading on the NYSE and the NASD mar-
ket system for several years. See Securities Exchange Act Release, No. 16,701, 1979-1980 Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) $ 82,483 (Mar. 26, 1980); SEC Lobbied By NASD, NYSE for Options
Approval, Sec. Week, Aug. 27, 1984, at 5. These concerns were later resolved, however, and
both the NASD and the NYSE now trade options. See generally Seligman, supra note 5 (de-
scription of structure of options trading market).
58. See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 24,622, 52 Fed. Reg. 24,572 (June 19, 1987)
[hereinafter Release No. 24,622]; Securities Exchange Act Release No. 22,026, 50 Fed. Reg.
20,310, 20,324 n.147 (May 6, 1985). With respect to "tippee" trading, the NYSE stated that
"front-running violations may also occur in certain agency situations, such as where a member
passes on non-public information concerning block transactions to a customer who then trades
on the basis of the information." New York Stock Exchange Information Memo No. 80-38
(Sept. 11, 1980) (Front-Running of Blocks).
59. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 19,133, 47 Fed. Reg. 46,946 (Oct. 14, 1982).
60. A stock index options or futures contract represents an underlying portfolio of com-
mon stocks, i.e., the Standard & Poor's 500. The contract's value fluctuates as the value of the
underlying stock portfolio changes. With the S & P 500, these changes are reflected in changes
in the S & P 500 Stock Price Index. A seller of the contract will deliver, and a buyer will
accept delivery, of the value of the stock portfolio at a certain date for a specific price. Unlike
commodity futures and options, stock index options and futures always settle in cash. The
actual underlying stocks are not delivered. However, similar to commodities options and fu-
tures, the parties may offset their contracts prior to the delivery date. See Katara v. D.E. Jones
Commodities, Inc., 835 F.2d 966, 967 (2d Cir. 1987); Markham & Gilberg, Washington Wash:
Stock Index Futures, 6 CORP. L. REV. 59 (1983). In 1982, Congress determined that the
CFTC, which otherwise has exclusive jurisdiction over the regulation of commodity futures
contracts, see 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1982), would be required to share jurisdiction with the SEC in
stock index contracts. The SEC was given authority over options on such indexes, and, in
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concern was engendered by unusual trading activities on the CBOE on April
19, 1984. Preliminary indications suggested that the unconventional trading
involved front-running. 61 The CBOE conducted an investigation of this ac-
tivity62 and Congress also expressed its concern. 63 Although apparently no
charges were ever brought, this activity heightened the awareness that front-
running could pose a threat to market integrity. Thereafter, the NASD an-
nounced the creation of a surveillance system designed to detect front-run-
ning in its stock index contracts." In addition, the SEC created an
Intermarket Surveillance Group composed of the NASD and the securities
exchanges. 65 It acted to tighten front-running prohibitions and improve de-
tection methods. A committee of the Securities Industry Association, how-
effect, veto power over the CFTC's approval of index contracts on futures exchanges. Horwitz
& Markham, Sunset on the Commodity Futures Trading Commission: Scene II, 39 Bus. LAW.
67, 74 (1983). See generally H.R. REP. No. 565, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 37-38, reprinted
in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS. 4022, 4049-50 (discussing the purpose of such a
move).
61. Bonner, Options Inquiry Continues, N.Y. Times, May 4, 1984, at D14, col. 1; Bonner,
Arbitrage Trading Examined, N.Y. Times, May 3, 1984, at D20, col. 1; Williams, S.E. C. Stud-
ying Trades on the S. & P. 100 Index, N.Y. Times, Apr. 26, 1984, at Dl, col. 1. One author
has stated with respect to this trading activity that:
[T]he only demonstrated example of deliberate abuse in the relations between the
options market and the underlying stocks was an oddity on April 19, 1984, when the
small New York house of Miller Tabak Hirsch bought $100 million worth of stock
on the NYSE to push into the money a bunch of previously worthless (and thus
virtually free) call options on the S & P 100 at the Chicago Board Options Exchange,
the lack of hard evidence of manipulation between markets may well mean only that
the SEC put little effort into looking at possible excesses by the big brokerage houses
after 1981, when John Shad of E.F. Hutton became chairman. The failure of the
SEC to move against Miller Tabak Hirsch conveyed the message that fair would be
foul and foul would be fair: A little manipulation was okay.
M. MAYER, supra note 4, at 130.
62. CBOE Completes Preliminary Investigation on Alleged OEX Front Running, Sec.
Week, Aug. 20, 1984, at 3.
63. Dingell Urges Options Pilot Be Delayed, Writes CFTC, SEC, Sec. Week, May 7, 1984,
at 7.
64. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 22,404, 50 Fed. Reg. 38,235, 38,236 (Sept. 13,
1985).
65. Id; Release No. 24,622, supra note 58. The NYSE also issued a memorandum to its
members on November 6, 1985, which stated:
The exchange wishes to emphasize to all members and member organizations the
applicability of the front-running prohibition to both over-the-counter options and
index options. With respect to index options, when a member or person associated
with a member or member organization is in possession of material non-public mar-
ket information concerning a block-size transaction in the component stock of an
index, the execution of which affects the value of the index, trading in options on that
index before information concerning the block transaction has been made publicly
available, to take advantage of the non-public information, may violate just and equi-
table principles of trade, Exchange Rule 476.
New York Stock Exchange Information Memo No. 85-36 (Nov. 6, 1985) (Prohibition Against
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ever, criticized some of the efforts of this group as constituting improper
rulemaking.66
These self-regulatory efforts did not result in a great number of discipli-
nary proceedings. Apparently, only three such cases have been brought by
the CBOE. All were settled by consent. In the first of these, In re Gruntal &
Co., 67 the CBOE Business Conduct Committee charged that an agent of
Gruntal & Co. entered an order to sell 100 American Telephone & Tele-
graph Co. (AT & T) call option contracts while in possession of material
nonpublic information concerning a block transaction in AT & T common
stock.61 It is unclear from the decision whether the conduct at issue in-
volved trading ahead of a customer's order, "tippee" information, or self-
front-running.
In a second case, In re Prudential-Bache Securities, Inc,,69 the Business
Conduct Committee charged that an employee of Prudential-Bache, entered
and executed two orders to sell Federal Express (FDX) calls while aware of
the material terms of an impending block transaction involving 93,000
shares of FDX common stock, prior to the public dissemination of informa-
tion concerning the block transaction in the underlying security.70 Pruden-
tial-Bache responded that it entered the option transactions to partially
hedge a previously established "long" position in FDX shares arising from
an earlier purchase of a large block of FDX common stock.7 The scope of
this decision is also unclear. The Business Conduct Committee rejected the
assertion that the options trades were a legitimate device to hedge a previ-
ously existing position.72 The Committee did not specify whether the "im-
pending" 93,000 share block transaction was for the respondent's own
account or otherwise. This uncertainty is compounded by the fact that the
employee of the brokerage firm was also charged with the same violation for
executing the orders at issue, suggesting that more than self-front-running
was involved.73
Front-Running of Blocks). At about the same time, the Philadelphia Stock Exchange issued a
similar warning to its members. Philadelphia Stock Exchange, Circular 85-82 (Dec. 3, 1985).
66. See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 25,233, 53 Fed. Reg. 296 (Dec. 30, 1987).
67. No. 85-0113 (CBOE Bus. Conduct Comm. Apr. 29, 1986) (decision accepting offer of
settlement).
68. Id.
69. No. 87-009 (CBOE Bus. Conduct Comm. Aug. 3, 1987) (decision accepting offer of
settlement).
70. Id. at 2.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. See In re Markowitz, No. 87-009(a) (CBOE Bus. Conduct Comm. Aug. 3, 1987) (de-
cision accepting offer of settlement).
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The third case, In re K & M Investments Co.,74 also raises questions as to
whether hedging activities constitute improper self-front-running. On Feb-
ruary 19, 1986, at approximately 2:08 p.m. Chicago time, a broker for K &
M Investments Co. entered and executed an order to sell 100 AT & T call
option contracts." About three minutes later, the NYSE reported a 352,700
share block transaction involving AT & T common stock, in which K & M
Investments Co., through the same broker who entered the call option order,
purchased 45,000 shares of AT & T stock.7 6 Based on these circumstances,
the Business Conduct Committee charged that the broker entered and exe-
cuted the option order while in possession of material nonpublic information
concerning the 352,700 share block transaction.
77
This decision is also confusing in that it appears that the block trader is
the respondent and that it sold the options while in the process of purchasing
the block. This would seem to be some form of hedging transaction, unless
the trader intended that the options sale have a depressing effect on the mar-
ket. In any event, the sanctions in these cases were not particularly large.
Fines ranged from $5,000 to $15,000. For example, in the Prudential-Bache
transaction, the employee was fined $5,00078 while the brokerage house was
fined $1 5,000. 7' The paucity of cases also suggests that either these practices
were not widespread or that they were not being detected. With regard to
detection, in early 1987 the CBOE adopted tougher investigatory procedures
in order to detect front-running more readily, and proposed a change in its
front-running circular specifically targeting self-front-running. 80  The
74. No. 87-0030 (CBOE Bus. Conduct Comm. Apr. 13, 1988) (decision accepting offer of
settlement).
75. Id. at 2.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. In re Markowitz, No. 87-009(a) (CBOE Bus. Conduct Comm. Aug. 3, 1987) (decision
accepting offer of settlement).
79. In re Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., No. 87-009, at 2 (CBOE Bus. Conduct Comm. Aug.
3, 1987).
80. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 24,538, 52 Fed. Reg. 22,015, 22,015-16 (June 10,
1987). The CBOE's proposed self-front-running change stated that:
Regarding self-front-running, if a firm's options trading prior to effecting proprietary
block transactions was found to have been calculated to take advantage of options
participants who were unaware of the market impact of the impending proprietary
transaction, the Exchange may find that this constituted front-running. Similarly,
options trading designed to take advantage of the options market prior to proprietary
index-related programs-for example, trading options prior to unwinding proprie-
tary arbitrage programs that "move the market" at expiration, could be interpreted
as front-running. Such findings, would depend on all of the facts of the specific case
and would of course, be decided on a case by case basis.
Regulatory Division, CBOE, Education Circular No. 23 (revised): Front Running Blocks 5,6
(July 22, 1987).
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CBOE's concern with respect to self-front-running seems to have been en-
gendered by an increase in large block trading activity that involves option
strategies.
A. Front-Running as Insider Trading, Fraud or Manipulation Under the
Securities Exchange Act
As discussed above, the SEC has for the most part deferred to the ex-
changes in seeking to restrict front-running activities in markets under its
jurisdiction. As will be shown by the following analysis, this position may be
due to uncertainty as to whether the federal securities laws are broad enough
to apply to front-running activities.
1. Insider Trading
The SEC Options Study premised its criticism of front-running on the
ground that the practice was based on "non-public market information."'"
The SEC had long sought to prohibit the use of "inside" information by
traders, charging that such conduct violated, among other things, rule lOb-
5,82 promulgated under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934.83 The SEC's initial effort in this area came in In re Cady Roberts &
Co., 14 where the SEC held that corporate insiders were obligated either to
disclose material nonpublic information before trading or to abstain from
trading altogether. The SEC, however, required the existence of a relation-
ship between the insider and the corporation affording access to inside infor-
mation intended to be available only for a corporate purpose.8 5 It premised
its decision on the unfairness of allowing a corporate insider to take advan-
tage of that information by trading without disclosure to the investor.86
Subsequently, in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,87 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit adopted the Cady Roberts prohibi-
tion, stating that "anyone" in possession of material inside information:
81. SEC OPTIONS STUDY, supra note 11, at 183.
82. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1987).
83. 15 U.S.C. § 78(b) (1982). Section 10(b) and rule l0b-5 thereunder are the most widely
litigated provisions of the federal securities laws. See generally 5, 5A-5D, A. JACOBS, LITIGA-
TION AND PRACTICE UNDER RULE 10B-5 (1986) (treatise volumes on lOb-5 pleading and
practice). The courts have also upheld private rights of action under rule lOb-5. Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, reh'g denied, 425 U.S. 986 (1976); 5 A. JACOBS, supra
§§ 8.01-8.04.
84. 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
85. Id. at 912.
86. See Feiner, Broker-Dealer's Duty to the Marketplace, 50 BROOKLYN L. REV. 783, 784
nn.5-6 (1984).
87. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1963), cert. denied sub nom. Coates v. SEC, 394 U.S. 976
(1969).
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"must either disclose it to the investing public, or, if he is disabled from
disclosing it in order to protect a corporate confidence, or he chooses not to
do so, must abstain from trading in or recommending the securities con-
cerned while such inside information remains undisclosed." 88
In Texas Gulf Sulphur, officials of the company purchased stock with in-
side information about the company's oil discovery activities. The court
held that this violated rule lOb-5 and section 10(b) because the officials
traded before the news could reasonably have been expected to appear over
the "media of widest circulation."'8 9 The Texas Gulf Sulphur decision
placed no limits on the reach of its insider trading prohibition. The court
referred to "anyone" in possession of material inside information.' Specifi-
cally, it did not exclude persons who were not insiders but had obtained
inside information through their own resources.
The SEC thereafter sought to apply this insider trading concept to non-
public market information, i.e., material information not held by a corporate
insider but obtained by someone outside the corporation. 91 The United
States Supreme Court, however, did not adopt the SEC's market information
theory. In Chiarella v. United States,92 the Supreme Court held that "[a]
duty to disclose under section 10(b) does not arise from the mere possession
of nonpublic market information. '"9 Rather, such a duty arises from the
existence of a fiduciary relationship between the trader and the source of the
information.94 Consequently, an investor having no fiduciary relationship
need not disclose nonpublic market information and may trade upon it, even
88. Id. at 848.
89. Id. at 854.
90. Id. at 848.
91. In SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180 (1963), the United States
Supreme Court found that the defendant violated an antifraud provision under the Investment
Advisors Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1982). There, the defendant was "scalping" by
purchasing shares of a security before recommending it to its customers. The firm would then
sell the shares after the customer's purchases caused the price of the shares to increase. The
Supreme Court's decision was not premised on "inside" information. That is, the investment
adviser did not have nonpublic information concerning the activities of a particular issuer.
Rather, the advisor's own trading position was the significant market information. The failure
to disclose this material information constituted fraud in that case. Capital Gains Research
Bureau, 375 U.S. at 181.
The practice of "scalping" in the securities industry should not be confused with the practice
of "scalping" in the commodities industry. In the latter market, scalping involves quick in-
and-out trades. See Hammel v. Murlas Commodities, Inc., [1984-1986 Transfer Binder]
Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 22,268, at 29,374-75 (June 28, 1984), aff'd, No. 83-R624, Slip
Op. (CFTC Feb. 4, 1985); CFTC, GLOSSARY OF TRADING TERMS 50 (Mar. 10, 1988); S.
KLEINFIELD, THE TRADERS 104-05 (1983).
92. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
93. Id. at 235.
94. Id. at 230.
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if the information is obtained surreptitiously.9 5 In Chiarella, the trader was
a printer who obtained nonpublic information from confidential financial re-
ports being printed at the company where he worked.96
Later, in Dirks v. SEC,97 the Supreme Court again rejected the SEC's at-
tempts to regulate use of nonpublic information by persons who are not cor-
porate insiders. In Dirks, the Court held that an investment advisor who
obtained nonpublic information about a particular corporation had no duty
to disclose that information before trading or tipping others.9"
Bloodied but unbowed, the SEC then sought to create a misappropriation
theory under which inside traders could be prosecuted for "misappropriat-
ing" information from an employer. 99 The most famous of these efforts was
Carpenter v. United States,O in which a financial columnist and a stock
broker used nonpublic market information that was to appear in a column in
the Wall Street Journal and which almost inevitably would affect security
prices. The reporter and the stock broker used such information to trade
their own accounts."10 The Supreme Court, by an equally divided vote, af-
firmed the conviction of the financial writer and the broker under section
10(b) for misappropriating the property of the newspaper publication, as op-
posed to that of the issuer.1 °2 In addition, the Court unanimously upheld
the convictions for this same conduct under the mail and wire fraud statutes
as constituting a fraud upon the Wall Street Journal. The Court held that
the Wall Street Journal had been deprived of its property right of making
95. Id. at 235.
96. Id. at 224. In Zweig v. Hearst Corp., 594 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir. 1979), it was charged
that a financial columnist had violated § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by
purchasing stock in a company at a discount, publishing a favorable column about the com-
pany, waiting for a resulting rise in the market, and then selling the stock at a profit. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that there was a triable issue:
Whether the columnist, by trading in securities of a company on which he reported and then
failing to disclose that fact in his column, intended to manipulate the market for his own
personal gain by falsely creating an aura of unbiased advice. The court held this to be a con-
flict of interest that must be disclosed if it was not apparent to other investors. This decision,
however, was subsequently questioned by the Ninth Circuit because of the Supreme Court's
intervening decision in Chiarella. See Feldman v. Simkins Indus., 679 F.2d 1299, 1304 (9th
Cir. 1982).
97. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
98. Id. at 656-57 n. 15, 667.
99. This "misappropriation" theory was based on language in Dirks where the Supreme
Court noted that Dirks had not misappropriated or illegally obtained the information at issue.
See id. at 665.
100. 108 S. Ct. 316 (1987); see D. LANGEVOORT, INSIDER TRADING HANDBOOK (1987);
R. WINANS, TRADING SECRETS: AN INSIDER'S ACCOUNT OF THE SCANDAL AT THE WALL
STREET JOURNAL (1986).
101. Carpenter, 108 S. Ct. at 319.
102. Id. at 320.
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exclusive use of the confidential business information in its columns before
publication. 103
It is difficult to tell how front-running would fall within this now convo-
luted law of insider trading and misappropriation.'04 The answer largely
depends on the station the front-running trader occupies, and the trader's
source of the information. To illustrate, it could be charged that a handling
broker positioning a block for a large trader misappropriates information
that belongs to that trader where the broker trades for his own account. On
the one hand, it is difficult to see how this theory would apply to the block
trader itself 1°5 or to someone who learns of the information but has no fidu-
ciary or comparable relationship with the block trader. Moreover, if the
block trader does not wish to pursue a claim against the broker, as where the
block trader itself provided a tip, the absence of a victim would render it
difficult to establish fraud. On the other hand, an employee of the block
trader may be in a position similar to the Wall Street Journal reporter in the
Carpenter case. That is, he has misappropriated confidential business infor-
mation of his employer, assuming of course that the block trader is willing to
so charge. 106
To the extent that a broker-dealer is front-running by trading ahead of a
customer, either on the basis of inside information as to the customer's trad-
ing or otherwise, a recent SEC case is of interest. In In re Application of E..
Hutton & Co., 10 7 the SEC, in a three to two decision, held that an exchange
had properly disciplined a brokerage firm when the firm sold stock for its
own account at a price better than a limit order the broker held for one of its
customers. 108 The SEC found that this violated the broker's fiduciary duty
103. Id. at 320-22.
104. It should be noted that there are specific SEC provisions directed to particular forms
of insider trading. For example, corporate insiders are prohibited from receiving short term
profits from securities transactions where they have held a security for less than six months.
See Securities Exchange Act § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1982). In addition, SEC Rule 14e-3
prohibits persons with material nonpublic information concerning a tender offer from trading
unless they disclose the information. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (1988).
105. See generally Cohen, Business Week Case Liability to Come Down to Acts of Individu-
als, Not Companies, Wall St. J., July 29, 1988, at 19, col. 3.
106. Also of consideration are state law doctrines that assert that corporate officers and
directors are trustees of their company and stand in a fiduciary relationship to the company,
which precludes them from profiting at the expense of the company and from diverting per-
sonal gain from the opportunities that belong to the company. See, e.g., Farber v. Servan Land
Co., 662 F.2d 371 (5th Cir. 1981); Kidwell v. Meilke, 597 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1979); City of
Miami Beach v. Smith, 551 F.2d 1370 (5th Cir. 1977); Litwin v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S.2d 667 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1940).
107. See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 25,887 [Current Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 84,303 (July 6, 1988).
108. Id. at 89,327.
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to the customer because the broker was competing with the customer. 109
The SEC noted that, in an analogous situation involving the trading of silver
futures on the Chicago Board of Trade, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit had held, in United States v. Dial,11° that trading
ahead of a customer, when done without disclosure to the customer, was
contrary to a broker's fiduciary obligations and harmful to commodity fu-
tures trading because it meant that there was a conflict of interest between
the broker and the customer.111
More difficult questions would be raised where the front-running stock-
holders of the block trader engage in front-running. Such traders are not
corporate insiders in any traditional sense, unless the amount of stock they
own makes them such. Under generally accepted. accounting principles,
however, certain transactions between a principal stockholder of a corpora-
tion and the corporation are presumed to be for the benefit of the corpora-
tion and, therefore, accounted for as capital transactions.112 Under this
interpretation, it could be claimed that the principal's transactions should be
for the benefit of the corporation and that the trading should, therefore, be
done for the principal's benefit and not the stockholder's. In that regard,
SEC rule 1-02(q) of Regulation S-XI13 defines a principal owner of equity
securities as a holder of record of more than ten percent of any class of
equity securities. Generally accepted accounting principles use the same
amount. 1 4 Consequently, if the front-running trader owns more than ten
percent of the stock, the company engaging in a block trade could assert a
claim for misappropriation of proprietary information. In such a case, the
front-running shareholder could be subject to criminal and civil sanctions by
the government and a private suit by the company involved.
2 Fraud on the Market
Another possible theory of liability for front-running may be the so-called
"fraud on the market theory" upheld in Basic Inc. v. Levinson," 5 by four
109. Id. at 89,239.
110. 757 F.2d 163 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 838 (1985); see also infra notes 173-79
and accompanying text (discussing Dial).
111. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 25,887, supra note 107 at 89,330 (citing Dial,
757 F.2d at 168-69).
112. See FIN. ACcT. STANDARDS BD., ACCOUNTING STANDARDS, ORIGINAL PRO-
NOUNCEMENTS, ACCOUNTING FOR STOCK ISSUED TO EMPLOYEES: ACCOUNTING INTERPRE-
TATIONS OF APB OPINION No. 25,658 (1985).
113. 17 C.F.R. § 210.1-02(q) (1988).
114. FIN. ACCT. STANDARDS BD., supra note 112.
115. 108 S. Ct. 978 (1988). Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, and Kennedy did not participate in
this case.
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members of the Supreme Court. This fraud theory is based on the hypothe-
sis that, in an open and developed securities market, the price of a com-
pany's stock is determined by the available material information regarding
the company and its business.1 16 Consequently, misleading statements will,
if publicly disseminated, affect all market prices and will defraud purchasers
of stock, even if they do not directly rely on the misstatements. The required
causal connection between damage and injury is established by the fact that
the affected investors were trading on an organized exchange that would
have reflected a true value if the misleading nature of the information was
known. The Court in Basic held that there was a rebuttable presumption of
reliance where the presence of a fraud on the market is shown.117
It could be claimed that front-running constitutes a fraud on the market
because the trader has an unfair advantage. That is, the front-running trader
has material information unknown to other purchasing and selling traders.
Consequently, the market price of the security being bought and sold does
not reflect the true value of the security. The front-running trader profits by
the discrepency between the security's true value and its market value. This
theory, however, makes a fundamental assumption. The assumption is that
trading merely on the basis of nonpublic market information constitutes
fraud, a perspective that appears to have been rejected in the Chiarella and
Dirks cases."' The distinction between nonpublic "market" information
and so-called "inside" information is not easily drawn. Inside information
involves a trade secret or confidential information affecting the operations of
a specific company that is not publicly available to persons other than the
company's employees or fiduciaries. Conversely, market information is in-
formation, even if known only by a few persons, obtained from publicly
available sources or even from, as in the Dirks case, corporate insiders,1 19
provided that the information is not misappropriated or otherwise illegally
obtained.
In addition, there is a question of whether at least some front-running
activities are desirable. As Congress has recognized, one of the legitimate
purposes of options trading is to provide a mechanism for the hedging of
securities positions.' 2 ° Such hedging activities could occur in a number of
116. Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154, 1160-61 (3d Cir. 1986).
117. 108 S. Ct. at 991-92.
118. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 654 (1983); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 233
(1980).
119. 463 U.S. at 954-55.
120. In 1982, Congress adopted legislation that preempted state gambling laws to permit
stock options index transactions. Congress was concerned that such laws could be applied to
options products with cash settlement features. Act of October 13, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-303,
96 Stat. 1409-1410 (amending Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77b; Securities Exchange
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respects. For example, a trader holding a block position in a stock may
write call options' 21 at a time when the trader believed that the market
would be flat or would be dropping briefly, but would later recover. The
trader may not wish to dispose of the stock, since he believes that it will
recover its vitality later. By writing call options, the trader is avoiding the
transaction costs of selling the block of stock; he is maximizing the return on
this stock; and he is hedging against the possibility that the loss will not be
recovered, as the loss in the value of the stock may be offset in part by the
amount of the premiums received for the call option. On the other hand, if
the trader is wrong, the stock will be called away and the trader will have
foregone that return.
1 2 2
Further, block traders wishing to sell or buy stock need another form of
hedging protection. A positioner, in selling a block of stock, can expect that
in many instances the sale will result in depressed market prices for that
stock. Conversely, a purchase of a block can itself result in increased prices.
The block trader, therefore, may take a loss on the stock, if he is selling, or
pay more than the market price, if he is buying, unless his block trading
activity can be hedged. The selling trader may hedge against this reaction by
purchasing a put option or by writing call options and using the premium
received from the call option to offset, at least in part, the loss in the value of
the stock. A purchasing trader, on the other hand, could purchase call op-
tions that would allow him to profit in the event of a market increase for the
block purchase-profit which would offset, at least in part, the increased
price paid for the block.12
3
Speculators and other hedgers absorb market risks shifted by the block
traders' hedging. Such traders, however, may contend that this activity is, if
not fraudulent, unfair because they are required to pay for the effects on
market prices resulting from block transactions. It has, however, tradition-
ally been thought that an appropriate use of derivative markets, such as fu-
tures markets, is to facilitate cash market transactions by allowing the
traders to hedge their large transactions so that they will not suffer a loss
from the market effects of their activity.1 24 Therefore, the issue seems to be
Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78c, 78i, 78bb; Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-
2). In proposing this amendment, the House Report noted that options contracts traded on
national securities exchanges could potentially benefit public investors by providing mecha-
nisms for risk-shifting, which presumably included hedging activities. H.R. REP. No. 626,
97th Cong., 2d Sess. pt. I, at 9, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2780,
2787.
121. See supra note 5 (discussing call stock options).
122. See generally SEC OPTIONS STUDY, supra note 11, at 109-10.
123. Id. at 110-12.
124. See supra text accompanying notes 53-55; infra notes 147-48 and accompanying text.
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more one of policy on the proper role of the markets rather than an issue of
fraud.
3. Manipulation
Section 9 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934125 prohibits practices
that could result in a manipulation of securities prices on a national securi-
ties exchange, a concept that has been incorporated into the Securities Act of
1933 for other securities transactions. 12 6 Manipulation of securities prices
often occurred in connection with option transactions.127 A leading author
has noted that stock options may serve as legitimate "hedges against market
movements," but that granting of options to pools and syndicates was at the
bottom of most manipulative operations that led to the creation of the SEC
because they allowed the operator to engage in large-scale manipulation with
a minimum of financial risk.12
Congress initially would have prohibited all option trading under the Se-
curities Exchange Act of 1934.129 But testimony from dealers in over-the-
counter options indicated that options served useful purposes,1 30 and thus
should not be banned. For example, they offered "assurance against loss"
for transactions in the underlying securities, had a "stabilizing quality," and
permitted an "operator of moderate means to protect a position in the mar-
ket at a minimum risk," 13 I thereby serving as "insurance" in a manner simi-
lar to "hedging" operations that guard against price changes in commodity
futures trading.1 32 Consequently, Congress did not ban option trading. In-
stead, it allowed the SEC to regulate such transactions under section 9.133
This statute was designed to give the SEC broad regulatory authority over
option trading on securities exchanges, as well as to prohibit specific manip-
125. 15 U.S.C. § 78i (1982).
126. As the court noted in SEC v. Resch-Cassin & Co., 362 F. Supp. 964 (S.D.N.Y. 1973),
"it is well settled that the manipulative activities prohibited by § 9(a)(2) of the Securities Ex-
change Act with respect to a listed security are violations of § 17(a) of the Securities Act and
§ 10(b) of the Exchange Act when the same activities are conducted with respect to an over-
the-counter security." Resch-Cassin & Co., 362 F. Supp. at 975.
127. 3 L. Loss, SECURITIEs REGULATION 1529-30 (2d ed. 1961).
128. Id. at 1544.
129. H.R. 7852, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 17-18 (1934); Stock Exchange Regulation: Hearings
on H.R. 7852 and H.R. 8720 Before the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,
73d Cong., 2d Sess. 457-64, 885-86 (1934) [hereinafter 1934 Hearings].
130. 1934 Hearings, supra note 129, at 457-64.
131. Id. at 457-58.
132. Id. at 460. In fact, during congressional hearings in 1934 it was stated that stock
options had "their origin in transactions involving the merchandising of commodities, and in
this respect are closely akin to the futures contract system now in vogue and such an indispen-
sable part of the marketing of all great staple commodities." Id. at 457-58.
133. 15 U.S.C. § 78i (1982).
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ulative practices such as the spreading of rumors, wash sales and matched
orders that seek to create a false or misleading appearance of active trading
in a security. 134
The essential purpose of section 9 "is to prevent rigging of the market and
to permit operation of the natural law of supply and demand."' 135 It sought
to prevent the creation of a price "mirage" rather than the reflection of a
genuine demand. 136  Accordingly, the statute provides a specific private
right of action for purchasers or sellers injured by violations of its terms'3 7
as well as criminal penalties. 31 It should be noted, however, that " 'manip-
ulation' is 'virtually a term of art when used in connection with securities
markets'" and refers to practices such as "wash sales, matched orders, or
rigged prices, that are intended to mislead investors by artificially affecting
market activity. '' 139 To establish manipulation there must be a manipulative
intent: "So long as the investor's motive in buying or selling a security is not
to create an artificial demand for, or supply of, the security, illegal market
manipulation is not established.""'
In the case of front-running, it does not appear that traders engaging
therein intend to create an artificial price. To the contrary, they seek the
advantage of existing market prices that presumably reflect supply and de-
mand. In other words, they seek to withhold nonpublic material informa-
tion that will affect market prices. By trading before that information comes
to the marketplace, they attempt to profit. This does not fit the traditional
concept of manipulation or a "price mirage." Further, while
"[m]anipulative schemes may not be allowed to succeed solely because they
134. See infra notes 135, 139 and accompanying text.
135. United States v. Stein, 456 F.2d 844, 850 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 922
(1973).
136. S. REP. No. 1455, supra note 129, at 54; see also Thornton v. SEC, 171 F.2d 702 (2d
Cir. 1948). At least one court has found the prevention of price mirages to be a goal of laws
applied to commodity futures trading. See Minpeco, S.A. v. ContiCommodity Servs., Inc., 552
F. Supp. 332, 337 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). In Minpeco, the district court stated that fraud prohibi-
tions do not impose a duty to disclose to traders on the other side of the market information a
trader may have, but a duty to speak does arise where the defendants have engaged in deceit.
In this case, the district court held that, when defendants allegedly created a price mirage by
their actions, there was a duty for them to disclose that fact to other traders in the
marketplace.
137. 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e) (1982).
138. Id. § 78ff(a) (Supp. 11 1984) (willful violations); see also United States v. Projansky,
465 F.2d 123 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1006 (1973).
139. See Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 476 (1977) (quoting Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199 (1976); see also Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419
F.2d 787, 792-96 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 822 (1970).
140. Chris-Craft Indus. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 383 (2d Cir.), cert. denied
sub nom. First Boston Corp. v. Chris-Craft Indus., 414 U.S. 910 (1973).
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are novel[,]" 14 ' it is unclear whether the antimanipulation provisions of sec-
tion 9 can be stretched to fit front-running in securities. As will be discussed
below, the same problem is present with respect to commodity futures
transactions.
Nevertheless, in Margaret Hall Foundation v. Atlantic Financial Manage-
ment, Inc., '4 2 a district court upheld, against a motion to dismiss, an allega-
tion under section 9 that a company had manipulated the price of a stock by
inducing the plaintiff to buy the stock with false statements while propping
up its price through purchases with other clients' funds. At the same time,
the defendants were selling their own shares of the stock to take advantage
of the artificially inflated price.143 It could be claimed that this practice is
similar to front-running, in that the front-runner is inducing a purchase or
sale at a time when it knows that the market price is not a "true" one and
that it does not reflect the knowledge upon which the defendant is trading.
This is, however, a substantial extension of the types of practices that were
apparently intended to be included within section 9.
In summary, the law is quite unclear as to whether, and under what con-
ditions, front-running may constitute a violation of the federal securities
statutes. If the information was in some way misappropriated or taken
through a breach of a fiduciary duty, then an insider trading case might be
sustainable. A fraud-on-the-market theory might also be upheld under such
circumstances. It is doubtful, however, whether a manipulation claim could
be proved even where there was fiduciary duty or insider trading.
II. FRONT-RUNNING IN COMMODITY TRADING
Until the stock market crash in October, front-running was a relatively
unknown concept in the commodity futures industry. A review of the his-
tory and nature of futures trading and the provisions of the Commodity Ex-
change Act also raises complex issues in determining whether front-running
may be proscribed.
A. Background
Commodity futures exchanges are old institutions in the United States,
founded at about the time of the Civil War. " Initially, trading on the ex-
141. Crane Co., 419 F.2d at 793.
142. 572 F. Supp. 1475, 1484 (D. Mass. 1983).
143. Id.
144. See S. REP. No. 1131, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 11-13, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEws 5843, 5852-56; COMMODITY EXCHANGE ADMINISTRATION, TRADING IN
COMMODITY FUTURES 2-3 (1938); 2 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, REPORT ON THE GRAIN
TRADE 70 (1920); T. HIERONYMUS, ECONOMICS OF FUTURES TRADING 72-74 (1971).
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changes was limited to agricultural commodities. Their regulation, for that
reason, was centered in the Department of Agriculture and later transferred
to the CFTC. 45 For the same reason, at least until the 1970s, the commod-
ity exchanges and securities exchanges were considered to be two almost
completely separate universes, having different regulators and distinctive
classes of traders. 146
Sophisticated financial regulatory concepts such as those developed in the
securities industry have for the most part been alien to the futures industry.
Traditionally, there has been no insider trading concept comparable to that
employed by the SEC. This is because the hedging function of futures ex-
changes that allows a user or producer of a commodity to, in effect, insure
against adverse changes in prices, 14 7 has long been considered legitimate,
145. See generally H.R. REP. No. 975, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 36, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5844; J. MARKHAM, THE HISTORY OF COMMODITY FUTURES
TRADING AND ITS REGULATION 12-28 (1987).
146. The separate nature of the securities and futures markets is amply revealed in a foot-
note in the treatise by Louis Loss, perhaps the leading and most inclusive commentator on
regulatory developments in the securities markets. His treatise notes that: "The regulation of
the commodity markets is beyond the scope of this book." 2 L. Loss, supra note 127, at 1167
n. 10. In the 1970s, this separation began to narrow as commodity futures exchanges began to
trade securities-related products. See Markham & Gilberg, supra note 5.
147. There are essentially two types of traders in the commodity futures markets: specula-
tors and hedgers. A speculator is a trader who is simply taking a position and seeking to profit
from a gain or loss on price changes in the underlying commodity. The speculator is viewed to
be "crucial" in the commodity futures industry because his trading provides liquidity to the
marketplace and is used to offset the risk of hedgers. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 359 n.ll, 390 (1982); United States v. Dial, 757 F.2d 163, 165
(7th Cir. 1985); COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION, A STUDY OF THE NATURE,
EXTENT AND EFFECTS OF FUTURES TRADING BY PERSONS POSSESSING MATERIAL NON-
PUBLIC INFORMATION 14 (Sept. 1986) [hereinafter CFTC INSIDER TRADING REPORT]. A
hedger is a trader seeking protection against unfavorable changes in the underlying commod-
ity's prices. Id. For example, the manager of a portfolio stock may be anticipating a decline in
the stock market that will reduce the value of the portfolio. The portfolio manager, to avoid
the effects of such a decline, could enter into stock index futures contracts that, in the event of
a market decline, would allow the trader to receive a profit in the stock index futures contract
that offsets the decline in the value of the portfolio, assuming that its value tracks that of the
stock index upon which the futures contract is traded. This also allows the portfolio manager
to avoid transaction costs from selling out the portfolio, as well as the depression of prices that
could be caused by selling large amounts of stock. SEC REPORT, supra note 3, at 1-1, 1-2. In
fact, hedging strategies are often much more complex than that described above. For example,
so-called "dynamic hedging" may be used to constantly adjust portfolio components as the
market fluctuates. Id.; see also M. MAYER, supra note 4, at 62.
Speculators and hedgers are essential to another important function of the commodity fu-
tures markets-price discovery. They both provide a constant and actively traded market that
allows commercial users of the market everywhere to determine the given price of a commod-
ity. These prices are quoted in newspapers and other media and are relied upon by business-
men as a means of setting prices for cash transactions. For example, a farmer in Illinois may
decide to raise hogs instead of cattle because prices on the CME suggest that hogs would be a
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and even desirable. 148 Hedgers, almost by nature, engage in a front-running
operation. That is, they know that their transactions will often have a price
effect. If that effect is known to the rest of the marketplace, however, they
would not be able to hedge effectively. To cite an example: assume that a
large grain firm is selling a large amount of grain based on current prices.
The grain firm does not own the grain and must go to the cash market to
purchase it. But, if word of the grain purchases in the cash market leaks out,
cash prices will increase. In such an event, the grain firm could suffer a loss
or, at the very least, a substantial reduction of profits on the transaction.
Instead, the grain firm secretly hedges the transaction on a commodity ex-
change so that, when the purchase becomes known, the grain firm will be
protected on the basis of current prices. Such hedging has long been consid-
ered an essential function of the futures market. It effectively allows grain
firms to market large amounts of grain and other commodities without hav-
ing to do so with a large price risk that would dissuade most firms from
operating effectively.' 49
B. The Regulatory Structure: Front-Running Under the Commodity
Exchange Act
Analysis of the Commodity Exchange Act reveals that Congress has not
enacted any express provision that precludes front-running per se. Further-
more, many of the stumbling blocks to effective SEC regulation 5° also exist
under the Commodity Exchange Act. These limitations, coupled with the
apparent intent of the Commodity Exchange Act to permit hedging activi-
ties, render efforts to control front-running in commodities futures markets
problematic. A notable exception, is the forbidden practice of trading ahead
of customer orders by a broker.
1. Antifraud Provisions
The sections under which front-running may be attacked under the Com-
modity Exchange Act are limited. Section 4(b) is the principal antifraud
provision in that statute.I'I The jurisdictional language of section 4(b), how-
more profitable venture at that time. See generally 120 CONG. REc. 34,999 (1974) (statement
of Sen. Humphrey); Curran, 456 U.S. at 390; Dial, 757 F.2d at 165.
148. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
149. See generally U.S.D.A., CIRCULAR No. 151, Hedging in Grain Futures (June 1931)
(discussing various kinds of grain futures hedging techniques).
150. See supra notes 81-143 and accompanying text.
151. Section 4(b) of the Commodity Exchange Act states in part:
It shall be unlawful (1) for any member of a contract market, or for any correspon-
dent, agent, or employee of any member, in or in connection with any order to make,
or the making of, any contract of sale of any commodity in interstate commerce,
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ever, is in some respects incomprehensible. As the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit has stated, "[w]hile the intent to outlaw
fraud is clear," section 4(b)'s "syntactical mess" and its "crabbed" language
make it "difficult to answer some basic questions about coverage. 15 2 The
antecedent language in section 4(b) does, however, state that its terms apply
to "any person," 153 but the courts have not always found this language to
broaden other restrictive provisions of the convoluted language contained in
this statute.'5 4 Where the statute applies, however, criminal penalties are
available. 55
In Leist v. Simplot, '56 the Second Circuit concluded that there was no
made, or to be made, on or subject to the rules of any contract market, for or on
behalf of any other person, or (2) for any person, in or in connection with any order
to make, or the making of, any contract of sale of any commodity for future delivery,
made, or to be made, for or on behalf of any other person if such contract for future
delivery is or may be used for (a) hedging any transaction in interstate commerce in
such commodity or the products or byproducts thereof, or (b) determining the price
basis of any transaction in interstate commerce in such commodity, or (c) delivering
any such commodity sold, shipped, or received in interstate commerce for the fulfill-
ment thereof-
(A) to cheat or defraud or attempt to cheat or defraud such other person;
(B) willfully to make or cause to be made to such other person any false report or
statement thereof, or willfully to enter or cause to be entered for such person any
false record thereof;
(C) willfully to deceive or attempt to deceive such other person by any means
whatsoever in regard to any such order or contract or the disposition or execution of
any such order or contract, or in regard to any act of agency performed with respect
to such order or contract for such person; or
(D) to bucket such order, or to fill such order by offset against the order or orders
of any other person, or willfully and knowingly and without the prior consent of such
person to become the buyer in respect to any selling order of such person, or become
the seller in respect to any buying order of such person.
7 U.S.C. § 6b (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
152. Leist v. Simplot, 638 F.2d 283, 322-23 (2d Cir. 1980) (quoting BROMBERG & LOWEN-
FELS, SECURITIES FRAUD AND COMMODITIES FRAUD § 452, at 82.286 (1979)), aff'd sub nom.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353 (1982).
153. 7 U.S.C. § 6b(2) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
154. For example, in ACLI Int'l Commodity Services, Inc. v. Banque Populaire Suisse, 550
F. Supp. 144 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), a district court held that the "any person" language did not
allow a brokerage firm to sue a third party alleged to have fraudulently concealed its interest in
several commodity futures accounts. See also Korwek v. Hunt, 646 F. Supp. 953, 972
(S.D.N.Y. 1986); Michelson v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 619 F. Supp. 727,
740 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). Compare Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc. v. Moshtaghi, [1977-1980 Trans-
fer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 20,693 (S.D. Cal. 1978), aff'd in an unpublished
opinion (9th Cir. 1980) with Merrill Lynch Futures Inc. v. Kelly, 585 F. Supp. 1245, 1251
(S.D.N.Y. 1984) ("in other words, the primary focus of the statute is on fraud practiced by
brokers on their customers.").
155. 7 U.S.C. § 13 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
156. 638 F.2d 283, 322 (2d Cir. 1980), aff'd sub nom. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353 (1982).
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privity requirement in section 4(b), i.e., there need not be a direct privity
between the injured party and the wrongdoer. On appeal in that case, the
Supreme Court also held that under section 4(b), purchasers and sellers of
commodity futures contracts can make claims against persons they are not
dealing with but who are allegedly manipulating the market.1 57 The Court
stated that "all purchasers and sellers of futures contracts-whether they be
pure speculators or hedgers-necessarily are protected by section 4(b)." '15 8
Furthermore, the Court stated that "privity of dealing or even personal con-
tact, between potential defendant[s] or plaintiff[s] is the exception and not
the rule."15 9 Accordingly, it rejected any privity requirement for liability
under section 4(b).
Subsequently, however, Congress amended the Commodity Exchange Act
to provide for express private rights of action and added a statutory provi-
sion requiring privity." 6 Section 22 of the Commodity Exchange Act
16 1
now states that persons who may sue for damages are limited to: (1) a per-
son who has received trading advice from an individual for a fee; (2) a trader
defrauded by his own broker; or (3) a trader suing for manipulation. There-
fore, a person could not sue a front-runner unless: he had received trading
advice from the individual conducting the front-running; his own broker en-
gaged in front-running; or the front-running was viewed as per se
manipulation.
If these hurdles are overcome, section 4(b)(A) makes it illegal for persons
trading futures contracts to "cheat" or "defraud" other persons. 162 If it
could be shown that front-running constituted a fraud or that it was
designed to cheat someone else, then that proscription could apply. As will
be discussed below, however, the CFTC does not appear to be of the view
that trading on material nonpublic information operates to cheat or defraud
anyone unless the trader is an employee of a self-regulatory organization.
Section 4o, another antifraud provision in the Commodity Exchange
Act,1 63 proscribes fraudulent practices on the part of commodity trading
157. Curran, 456 U.S. at 389.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 390-94 (quoting Blue Chips Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 745
(1975)).
160. Futures Trading Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-444, § 235, 96 Stat. 2294, 2322-23 (codi-
fied at 7 U.S.C. § 25 (1982)).
161. 7 U.S.C. § 25 (1982).
162. 7 U.S.C. § 6b(A) (1982). There are criminal penalties under the Commodity Ex-
change Act for violations of § 4(b) as well as for manipulation. See id. § 13 (1982 & Supp. IV
1986). As will be discussed below, mail and wire fraud prohibitions may also apply. See infra
note 174.
163. 7 U.S.C. § 6o (1982).
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advisors and commodity pool operators. 164 To the extent that someone en-
gaged in front-running falls within those defined entities, consideration may
be given to whether section 4o would establish liability. Section 4o contains
the same antifraud language as does section 10(b) 165 and rule lOb-51 66 under
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Therefore, the analysis applied for
determining whether the front-running could be attacked under those securi-
ties laws may apply equally to section 40. 167 The case law, however, is not
sufficiently developed to determine whether this approach will prevail.' 61 In
any event, the CFTC will be reluctant to follow decisions under the federal
securities laws if they are interpreted to find hedging activities to be illegal
front-running. As discussed below, the CFTC views hedging activities as
desirable and not as improper "inside" trading.
In 1975, the CFTC proposed an antifraud rule for commodity options
transactions.1 69 Initially, it modeled that antifraud rule after rule lOb-5, the
popular weapon used by the SEC to combat fraud and the basis for most of
that agency's insider trading cases. The CFTC, however, later determined
to revise the proposed rule.170 Instead, it modeled the antifraud rule provi-
sion to track section 4(b) under the Commodity Exchange Act. It did so
because it was concerned that, if it adopted the same rule as that used by the
SEC, insider trading principles developed in the securities law area, which
are inapposite to the commodities futures market, would be applied auto-
matically to futures trading. This apparently constituted a rejection of
wholesale application of that provision to the commodity futures indus-
try. 17' Nevertheless, the CFTC chairman did sound a cautionary note in an
164. A commodity trading adviser is simply someone who is advising more than 15 cus-
tomers as to the value of commodity futures prices. Certain persons, however, are exempted
from that definition, such as newspapers, lawyers, and others. See CFTC v. Savage, 611 F.2d
270 (9th Cir. 1979); 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). A commodity pool operator is
someone operating a commodity pool, which is simply the commodity futures industry's ana-
logue to an investment company. Investors contribute their funds to the pool and those funds
are commingled and traded as a unit with other investors. See Lopez v. Dean Witter Reyn-
olds, Inc., 805 F.2d 880 (9th Cir. 1986); 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
165. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982).
166. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1988).
167. See supra notes 81-143 and accompanying text.
168. Cases that have considered § 4, codified at 7 U.S.C. § 6o (1982), have analogized it
to the federal securities laws. See, e.g., Messer v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 847 F.2d 673 (11th Cir.
1988); CFTC v. Savage, 611 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1979).
169. Commodities or Commodity Future Contracts, Leverage Contracts for Gold and Sil-
ver, Domestic Sales of Foreign Futures Contracts, 40 Fed. Reg. 18,187 (Apr. 25, 1975) (pro-
posed rule).
170. Final Rule, 40 Fed. Reg. 26,504 (June 24, 1975).
171. Specifically, the CFTC stated that it was "particularly concerned with the possibility
that determinations reached on commodity cases might misapply non-disclosure-of-informa-
tion standards taken from securities laws decisions, although it fully appreciates that a failure
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address to the National Press Club:
Now, I recognize the vast difference between the securities market
and the futures market in an approach to the "insider," but I'll bet
you that the general public and the consumer want us to ask ques-
tions about the possibility of large cash traders and of employees
and associates of large traders in the cash markets using their
knowledge to play the futures market with perhaps an inordinate
effect thereupon. 17
2
There are other fraud theories upon which front-running liability could
more certainly be imposed against persons other than someone who is hedg-
ing; for example, where a broker is front-running on the basis of information
obtained from customers, i.e., "trading ahead." In that connection, in
United States v. Dial, 173 the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit considered a criminal charge that a broker defrauded customers by
soliciting them to participate in a block trade and then traded ahead of the
orders, thereby allowing him to profit at the customer's expense. The court
held this to be mail and wire fraud, 174 and sustained the criminal conviction.
The court indicated that this type of trading was tantamount to insider trad-
ing. 175 It may, however, be difficult to apply this theory under the Com-
modity Exchange Act. In fact, the court in Dial noted that there was no
statute, regulation or exchange rule that specifically forbade inside trading,
block trading, or trading ahead of customers in the commodity futures busi-
ness, other than by floor brokers.1 76 The court held, however, that this was
a scheme to defraud in a "classic" sense because the broker was representing
to customers that he would obtain the best possible price for them but did
not do SO.177 By trading ahead of customers, the broker was misleading
them for his own profit, and breaching his fiduciary duty.178 Later, an Ad-
ministrative Law Judge at the CFTC concluded that the broker's conduct
constituted a violation of the antifraud provisions of section 4(b) because it
was a breach of fiduciary duty to his customers.179
to disclose information may operate as a fraud or deceit with respect to commodity transac-
tions in certain circumstances." 40 Fed. Reg. 26,504, 26,505 n.1 (June 24, 1975).
172. Excerpts from Speech by William T. Bagley, CFTC Chairman, before the National
Press Club, reprinted in [1975-1977 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) T 20,067, at
20,692 (Aug. 5, 1975).
173. 757 F.2d 163 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 838 (1985).
174. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 (1982).
175. Dial, 757 F.2d at 168-69.
176. Id. at 168.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. In re Dial, [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 23,772 (CFTC
Aug. 19, 1987). It should also be noted that the conduct in Dial seems to be comparable to
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Similarly, in United States v. Sleight,'8 the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Third Circuit upheld a restitution order based on a criminal
conviction for mail fraud. The defendant, an employee of a cocoa trading
firm, received kickbacks under a scheme that allowed him to purchase cocoa
at a price lower than the market price and then resell it to his employer at
the market price."' 1 The court held that the employee's firm was entitled to
the lower price.' 82 Although this case did not involve the Commodity Ex-
change Act, it would appear that an employee profiting from inside informa-
tion concerning the trading activities of his employer could be subject to an
antifraud standard. As noted by the court in Dial, 183 CFTC regulation
155.2184 requires exchanges to adopt rules that prohibit floor brokers from
purchasing futures contracts for their own accounts where they are holding
customer orders for the purchase of futures contracts, or options subject to
CFTC regulation.185 This rule is not, however, broad enough to apply to
front-running where such a broker has information concerning a securities
trade on a securities exchange. It applies only to trading ahead of futures
"scalping" found by the Supreme Court to be fraudulent in SEC v. Capital Gains Research
Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963); see also supra note 91. One author recently charged that
such trading ahead activity is "fairly common" on the floors of commodity exchanges. M.
MAYER, supra note 4, at 130.
180. 808 F.2d 1012 (3d Cir. 1987).
181. The employee was able to purchase the cocoa at a price lower than the market price
because the cocoa he acquired was in a form that was valued at a price less than cocoa ordina-
rily sold on the market. Id.
182. Id. at 1022.
183. 757 F.2d 163, 167 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 838 (1985).
184. 17 C.F.R. § 155.2 (1988).
185. This regulation was passed as a part of the CFTC's efforts to deal with so-called "dual
trading", where a broker is trading for his own account as well as the accounts of others.
When the CFTC was created in 1974, Congress directed it to consider whether and under
what conditions the Commission should permit dual trading. See 7 U.S.C. § 6j (1982). The
CFTC determined not to ban this practice. Instead, it established regulations such as 17
C.F.R. § 155.2 (1988), designed to assure elimination of abuses. This included the prohibition
against brokers trading for their own accounts ahead of customers. See generally Adoption of
Dual Trading Regulations, [1975-1977 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 20,242
(Dec. 23, 1976) (trading standards for floor brokers and futures commission merchants). In
addition, the CFTC sought to enhance its audit trail so that it could detect such abuses. It
principally focused upon requiring that execution times orders be timestamped in a more
timely fashion. Initially, this involved a "bracketing" system whereby color-coded order tick-
ets were used to allow a determination of execution time within a half hour. Later, as dis-
cussed below, the CFTC required up-to-the-minute timestamping. See generally J.
MARKHAM, THE HISTORY OF COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING AND ITS REGULATION 90-92
(1987) (discussing evolution of current timestamping rule). The continuation of dual trading
in parts of the stock index futures pit at the CME has been asserted to be the "single most
indefensible practice in today's markets in the United States" because it allows these brokers to
trade ahead of customer orders the brokers observe being transmitted to the pit. M. MAYER,
supra note 4, at 258.
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transactions. Similarly, regulation 155.3186 imposes requirements upon fu-
tures commission merchants who have information concerning customer or-
ders. It too, however, is limited to activities in the futures markets. As such,
neither rule addresses intermarket front-running, a practice causing increas-
ing concern. 187
2. Manipulation
Still another provision of the Commodity Exchange Act prohibits manip-
ulation,188 and would support an action against a front-runner if such activ-
ity was found to constitute manipulation. Manipulation, however, is not
defined in the Commodity Exchange Act, and this has caused vexing
problems for the CFTC, its predecessors and the courts. 189 The result has
been chaos and often conflicting decisions.1 9° Further, most manipulation
cases have resulted in years of investigation and litigation, often without ulti-
mate success. This effectively has nullified the reach of the antimanipulation
provision.1 91
Traditionally, manipulation cases arising under the Commodity Exchange
Act involved the spreading of rumors1 92 or the use of a particular trader's
market power to artificially affect prices during delivery periods. When a
trader holds a substantial portion or all of the deliverable supplies of the
186. 17 C.F.R. § 155.3 (1988).
187. See infra note 275 and accompanying text.
188. See 7 U.S.C. § 9 (1982).
189. See generally 2 P. JOHNSON, COMMODITIES REGULATION §§ 5.04-.05 (1982); T.
Russo, REGULATION OF THE COMMODITIES FUTURES AND OPTIONS MARKETS § 12.10
(1983); Campbell, Trading in Futures Under the Commodity Exchange Act, 26 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 215 (1958); Hieronymus, Manipulation in Commodity Futures Trading: Toward a Defi-
nition, 6 HOFSTRA L. REV. 41 (1977); McDermott, Defining Manipulation in Commodity Fu-
tures Trading: The Futures "Squeeze'" 74 Nw. U.L. REV. 202 (1979); Note, Abuses in the
Commodity Markets: The Need for Change in the Regulatory Structure, 63 GEO. L.J. 761
(1975); Note, Abuses in the Commodity Markets: Some Suggestions for Control, 25 SYRACUSE
L. REV. 788 (1974); Note, The Delivery Requirement: An Illusory Bar to Regulation of Manip-
ulation in Commodity Exchanges, 73 YALE L.J. 171 (1963).
190. Compare Volkart Bros. v. Freeman, 311 F.2d 52 (5th Cir. 1962) (evidence insufficient
to support charge of manipulation where corporation controlled "long" position on cotton
exchanges) and In re Indiana Farm Bureau Coop. Ass'n, [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] Comm.
Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) T 21,796 (CFTC Dec. 17, 1982) (price manipulation finding by lower
official overruled due to presence of crop shortages) with Cargill, Inc. v. Hardin, 452 F.2d 1154
(8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 932 (1972) (demand of artificially high wheat prices
deemed manipulation where defendant controlled 62% of wheat futures) and In re David G.
Henner, 30 Agric. Dec. 1151 (1971) (inflation of previous day's futures settlement price
deemed manipulation).
191. See J. MARKHAM, supra note 185, at 161-64.
192. See Moore v. Brannan, 191 F.2d 775 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 860 (1951);
United Egg Producers v. Bauer Int'l Corp., 311 F. Supp. 1375 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); In re Reuben
Earl McGuigan, 5 Agric. Dec. 249 (1946).
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commodity subject to delivery under the commodity futures contract,' 93 he
can "squeeze" or "comer" supplies, thus restricting the ability of traders to
exit the marketplace without paying the price he demands. For example, in
In re Cox, 94 a case that took some sixteen years to conclude, CFTC enforce-
ment authorities claimed that two traders manipulated the May 1971 wheat
futures market on the Chicago Board of Trade by acquiring and holding
substantially all of the available, deliverable supply of wheat, while simulta-
neously controlling a dominant long position in wheat futures.1 95 The en-
forcement division charged that the traders were able to demand an
artificially high price for the liquidation of the futures contracts.' 96 The
CFTC, however, reversing one of its administrative law judges, held that the
presence of the essential elements of manipulation was unproven and it dis-
missed the case.' 97 In so doing, the CFTC defined manipulation to include
the following elements: "(1) There must be an artificial price; (2) The actor
must have had the wherewithal to have caused the artificial price; (3) The
actor must have caused the artificial price; (4) The actor must have intended
to cause the artificial price."' 98 Ascertaining each of these elements is par-
ticularly difficult. For example, determining whether an artificial price ex-
isted often results in a battle of the experts as to whether the price was,
indeed, artificial. It is equally difficult, if not more so, to establish an intent
to cause artificiality and, with actively traded "world" commodities, it is
often claimed that the acting party did not have the wherewithal to effectu-
ate an artificial price.
Assuming that all of these elements can be established, front-running still
may not fall comfortably within the parameters of a manipulation charge.
193. See generally Cargill, Inc. v. Hardin, 452 F.2d 1154 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406
U.S. 932 (1972); Volkart Bros. v. Freeman, 311 F.2d 52 (5th Cir. 1962); G.H. Miller & Co. v.
United States, 260 F.2d 286 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 907 (1958); Great Western Food
Distrib. v. Brannan, 201 F.2d 476 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 997 (1953); General Foods
Corp. v. Brannan, 170 F.2d 220 (7th Cir. 1948); In re Indiana Farm Bureau Coop. Ass'n,
(1982-1984 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 21,796 (CFTC Dec. 17, 1982); In
re Hohenberg Bros., [1975-1977 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 20,271 (CFTC
1977); In re Tyson Foods, Inc., [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) T
20,608 (CFTC 1978); In re Plains Cotton Coop. Ass'n, No. 75-I1 (CFTC July 15, 1977), noted
in Schief & Markham, The Nation's "Commodity Cops" - Efforts by the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission to Enforce the Commodity Exchange Act, 34 Bus. LAW. 19, 37 (1978)
(cases discussing manipulation in factual context of trader's holding large percentages of the
market in a given commodity).
194. [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 23,786 (CFTC July 15,
1987).
195. Id. at 34,059.
196. Id. at 34,064.
197. Id. at 34,068.
198. Id. at 34,061.
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As noted in connection with the above discussion in securities manipulation
claims,' 99 the front-running party does not create an artificial price by en-
gaging in a futures transaction. If anything, he takes advantage of an artifi-
cial price-a price which is artificial because the market is yet unaware of
the fact that a large trade that will depress overall prices is coming.
Although it has been stated that the "methods and techniques of manipu-
lation are limited only by the ingenuity of man" and that tests for identifying
manipulation must be practical ones,2" labeling front-running as manipula-
tion turns the CFTC's manipulation elements on their head. It would, there-
fore, be quite difficult to proceed under antimanipulation provisions of the
Commondity Exchange Act.
3. Legislative Reform Efforts
The lack of specific prohibitions against front-running in the Commodity
Exchange Act, or other concepts of insider trading, is not accidental. In
fact, several legislative efforts to impose prohibitions have been attempted in
this area. For example, in 1973, the House Committee on Agriculture solic-
ited comments on whether Congress should add a provision to the Commod-
ity Exchange Act providing a private remedy, including treble damages, in
cases where a trader obtained and profited from insider information concern-
ing proposed government action.20 ' This provoked numerous negative re-
sponses, with several commentators questioning what was meant by the term
"insider information," and the provision was not adopted.20 2 Instead, Con-
gress adopted a provision proscribing most futures trading by CFTC
personnel.2 °3
Thereafter, in connection with the Futures Trading Act of 197 8,"04 Repre-
sentative Neal Smith proposed an amendment to include a forty-eight hour
export reporting requirement in the Commodity Exchange Act. This provi-
sion would have required firms engaging in large sales for exports of grain or
other commodities to report that information to the CFTC within forty-
eight hours of the sale.20 5 With this amendment, Representative Smith
sought to stop international traders from avoiding speculative limits and
199. See supra notes 125-143 and accompanying text.
200. Cargill, Inc. v. Hardin, 452 F.2d 1154, 1163 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 932
(1972).
201. See 119 CONG. REC. 41,333 (1973).
202. Review of the Commodity Exchange Act and Discussion of Possible Changes: Hearings
Before the House Comm. on Agriculture, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 132, 145, 198 (1973).
203. 7 U.S.C. § 13(d)-(e) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
204. Pub. L. No. 95-405, 92 Stat. 865 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-23 (1982 &
Supp. IV 1986)).
205. 124 CONG. REC. 22,871 (1978).
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manipulating the market to their advantage. He gave the example of a large
grain company taking futures positions with the nonpublic knowledge that it
had agreed to make a major grain sale to the Soviet Union.2"6 Utilizing such
information, the grain firm could "hedge" the sale and thereby shift the costs
of the price increase caused by the large sale back to the United States mar-
kets. Consquently, when grain prices did rise as a result of the Soviet
purchase, it would be American traders and the American public who would
absorb those price increases. Another Congressman, Edward R. Madigan,
suggested that this type of trading in the futures market might have a delete-
rious effect on small farmers selling their crops.20 7 This, however, is a clas-
sic example of hedging on the futures market. As the President of the
Chicago Board of Trade Clearing Corporation also noted in the 1978 hear-
ings, one of the "fundamental" differences between the securities and futures
markets is that futures trading is not subject to insider trading restric-
tions.2° s Although the House of Representatives adopted the Smith amend-
ment,209 a House-Senate conference committee rejected it because the
Department of Agriculture already had in place an agricultural commodity
export sales reporting program.2 10
In 1982, Congress again began pressing the CFTC to consider the applica-
tion of insider trading concepts to commodity futures trading. Of particular
concern to Congress were claims that conflicts of interest may have arisen on
the boards of directors of various exchanges during the so-called "silver cri-
sis" of 1979-1980, a period of volatile prices in the silver markets. This gave
rise to the possibility that board members were trading on the basis of inside
information gleaned from the members' positions on the board. 21  Repre-
206. Congressman Smith stated that if a large grain company has:
[S]ome secret information that only they and the state trading company in Russia or
somewhere else has, they have information that others do not have indicating a
change in the market. In that way, if they are getting a 2-or 3-week period to cover
the sale, they can "hedge" and transfer back onto the American market, at enormous
cost, the results from selling grain for less than it was really worth, due to the fact
that only they and the state trading company in the country knew the real demand
and the real value of the grain at that time.
Id.
207. Id. at 22,872.
208. Extend Commodity Exchange Act: Hearings on H.R. 10,285 Before the Subcomm. on
Conservation and Credit of the House Comm. on Agriculture, 95 Cong., 2d Sess. 481 (1978).
209. 124 CONG. REc. 22,873 (1978).
210. Id. at 33,886 (statement of Rep. Smith).
211. After an extensive investigation, the CFTC found no wrongdoing on the part of the
exchanges. See INVESTIGATIVE REPORT OF THE CFTC DIVISION OF TRADING AND MAR-
KETS, CFTC, THE SILVER MARKET OF 1979/1980: ACTIONS OF THE CHICAGO BOARD OF
TRADE AND THE COMMODITY EXCHANGE, INC. (undated); CFTC INSIDER TRADING RE-
PORT, supra note 147, at 37-38 & app. 1-b.
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sentative John B. Dingell also noted regulatory disparities between the SEC
and the CFTC. He charged that trading in futures contracts on corporate
securities, as in the case of stock index futures contracts, "would present
very serious new manipulative possibilities (e.g., intermarket manipulation,
trading on insider information, front-running, . . . etc.), engender extremely
difficult surveillance problems and expose investors to sales practice
abuses." '212 In addition, Morris Mendelson, a professor of finance at the
Wharton School, noted that futures market professionals had a time and
place advantage in executing transactions over the public investor. He
stated that this was analogous to insider trading problems on the securities
exchanges.213
During the congressional hearings in 1982, the Chairman of the CFTC,
however, boldly asserted that there were no insider trader prohibitions appli-
cable to commodity futures trading and that none were needed. Specifically,
he stated that "[t]here are no insider trading rules in the commodities indus-
try. There is almost no way to trade insider information in the commodities
industry." '214
Nevertheless, Representative Neal Smith, undeterred by his lack of suc-
cess in 1978, sought to add an amendment to the Commodity Exchange Act
that would have prohibited persons having insider information from engag-
ing in futures trading. The amendment defined an insider as any individual
who had access to information not generally available to the public regard-
ing present or anticipated cash or futures trading to which the individual
was not a party.215 This would effectively allow a large firm to hedge, but
212. SEC/CFTC Jurisdictional Issues and Oversight.- Hearings on H.R. 5447, H.R. 5515,
and H.R. 6156 Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection, and Fi-
nance and the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. on Energy and
Commerce, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 21 (1982).
213. Id. at 569. In fact, Professor Mendelson's concerns appeared to be the same type of
concerns expressed for many years with respect to trading on the floors of securities exchanges.
See SEC REPORT ON THE FEASIBILITY AND ADVISABILITY OF THE COMPLETE SEGREGA-
TION OF THE FUNCTIONS OF DEALER AND BROKER PURSUANT TO SECTION 11(E) OF THE
SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 (June 20, 1936).
214. SEC/CFTC Jurisdictional Issues and Oversight: Hearings on H.R. 5447, H.R. 5515,
and H.R. 6156 Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection, and Fi-
nance and Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. on Energy and Com-
merce, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 405 (1982).
215. The amendment proposed by Congressman Smith would have added a new § 8(d) to
the Commodity Exchange Act. It would have provided:
(d)(1) As used in this subsection "insider" means any individual who has access to
information, not generally available to the public, about present or anticipated cash
of futures trading or present or anticipated cash of futures positions, to which such
individual is not a party, in any commodity of any other person, where such trading
or positions are in amounts at or above Commission designated reporting levels as
specified pursuant to § 4i of this Act.
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would have precluded trading employees or other persons from learning
about the activities of the cash trader that could affect market prices. Thus,
the amendment recognized the necessity of preserving hedging activity.
2 1 6
A standard of materiality was also added to this provision and it was passed
by the House of Representatives.2 17 The Senate, however, determined that
the CFTC should first conduct a study on the nature, extent and effects of
futures trading by persons possessing material and nonpublic information
about cash or futures transactions to which they were not a party. The
scope of inquiry thus was limited to exclude examination of hedging and
self-front-running.21 8 The conference committee rejected the Smith amend-
ment and adopted the Senate proposal instead.219
Thereafter, the CFTC conducted a study and filed a report with Congress
that essentially rejected the application of insider trading concepts to futures
trading, except with respect to government and self-regulating organization
officials.22°
4. The CFTC Insider Trading Study
The CFTC's Insider Trading Report made clear that the Commission did
not consider hedging activities to constitute prohibited trading.2 21 In fact,
(2) No insider shall own, control, have a beneficial interest in, or enter into any
contract or contract for future delivery in any such commodity on any contract
market.
128 CONG. REc. H7521 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1982).
216. CFTC INSIDER TRADING REPORT, supra note 147, at 4.
217. 128 CONG. REC. H7522 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1982); CFTC INSIDER TRADING REPORT,
supra note 147, at 4.
218. 128 CONG. REC. H13,103 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1982).
219. H.R. REP. No. 964, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 46, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 4055, 4064. The study was provided for in § 23b of the Commodity Exchange
Act, as amended by § 236 of the Futures Trading Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-444, 96 Stat.
2294, 2325 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 26 (1982)).
At the Conference Committee Representative Smith stated that his concern with insider
trading centered on the live cattle contract where a thin market allegedly allowed insiders to
affect prices. Another Representative stated that he preferred the Senate provision because the
Neal amendment might be too specific and create a new cause of action without knowing the
exact nature of the problem. CFTC INSIDER TRADING REPORT, supra note 147, at 5-6. The
CFTC had asked the Conference Committee to reject the House bill because the prohibition on
trading by insiders could prevent floor brokers and brokerage firms who knew their customers'
positions in the market from trading and that this could "outlaw futures trading as commonly
conducted." Note, Trading in Commodity Futures Using Non-Public Information, 73 GEO.
L.J. 127, 133 n.39 (1984) (quoting letter from Philip Johnson, Chairman, CFTC to Edward
LaGarza, Chairman, House Committee on Agriculture (Nov. 22, 1982) at 9).
220. CFTC INSIDER TRADING REPORT, supra note 147.
221. The CFTC stated:
[T]he study does not address trading by persons with knowledge of their own posi-
tions in the cash or futures markets. The ability of any person to capture the value of
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the report stated that it did not seek to address trading by persons with
knowledge of their own positions in the cash or futures market because it
would defeat the market's basic economic function of allowing traders to
hedge the risks of their commercial enterprises.222
The CFTC noted that a securities insider owes a fiduciary duty to the
issuer of the security and to purchasers or sellers of the security.223 It is this
duty that gives rise to an obligation to disclose material inside information or
to refrain from trading. The CFTC asserted, however, that futures transac-
tions do not create a corresponding fiduciary relationship. 224 The futures
markets are derivative, risk-shifting markets and it would defeat their eco-
nomic function of hedging risks to question whether trading based on knowl-
edge of one's own position was permissible. Consequently, the CFTC
accepted what the SEC might have rejected: Hedging activities involving
front-running would not be viewed by the CFTC to be illegal or improper in
any way.
The CFTC Insider Trading Report also noted the existence of various
forms of fundamental information that could be considered materially non-
public. For example, a decision by a large cash trader to sell from inventory
could affect commodity futures prices.225 In addition, private or govern-
mental reports on existing supply or demand could constitute material non-
public information,226 as could reports of the actual price of a commodity, a
forecast of that price, and other political and economic information.227 Fur-
ther, the CFTC noted that members trading on the floor of the exchanges
had a time and place advantage which gave an "insider" aspect to informa-
tion obtained on the floor allowing members to trade before anyone else
could react to the information.228
In its report, the CFTC examined several instances where such material
nonpublic information could have been abused. For example, it cited a 1972
sale of wheat to the Soviet Union that caused dramatic increases in the price
his or her proprietary information is a traditional prerogative of commercial enter-
prise. Because the futures markets are derivative, risk-shifting markets, it would de-
feat the market's basic economic function-the hedging of risk-to question whether
trading based on knowledge of one's own position were permissible. Accordingly,
consistent with the congressional mandate, trading on the basis of one's own cash or
futures markets positions is exempt from any discussion of insider trading.
Id. at 8.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 7.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 17-18.
226. Id. at 39.
227. Id. at 19.
228. Id. at 24-25.
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of grain in the United States. It concluded, however, that no abuses associ-
ated with the transaction were ever proven, and that the phenomenon ap-
peared to be unique.229 In addition, the CFTC examined the trading in live
cattle futures contracts that had caused Representative Smith to propose the
insider trader prohibition in the Commodity Exchange Act. Representative
Smith stated that empirical analysis by the staff of the House Committee on
Small Business had indicated the existence of a trading system guaranteed to
predict certain changes in live cattle futures contracts with absolute accu-
racy. These conclusions, the Commission noted, were never proven. 230 The
study also examined other major markets phenomena, such as the events in
the silver market in 1979 and 1980. Once again, it found no specific abuses
of inside information. 231 The CFTC did not question governmental agen-
cies' ability to prevent leaks of material information.2 32 It reached similar
conclusions regarding reports from private entities.233
The CFTC found that insider information could reduce but not eliminate
the risks associated with futures positions because other factors affected mar-
ket prices concurrently.2 34 The CFTC also acknowledged, but ultimately
found unpersuasive, arguments suggesting that trading or insider informa-
tion could improve the pricing functions of futures markets by transmitting
information to the market, thereby reducing future price variances.2 35
The CFTC Insider Trading Report considered the effects of the dissimilar-
ity of the regulatory schemes of the SEC and the CFTC, that is, one prohib-
its the use of insider information while the other does not. The study
expressed doubt whether insider information relevant to securities could be
used to advantage in the futures markets.236 With respect to stock indexes,
the report stated that all the common markets in the securities and futures
areas are highly capitalized stock indexes on which specific inside informa-
229. Id. at 32-35. This was the so-called "Great Grain Robbery" that was "one of those
economic events that, like the OPEC oil embargo ... can truly be said to have changed the
world." D. MORGAN, MERCHANTS OF GRAIN 120-21 (1979).
230. CFTC INSIDER TRADING REPORT, supra note 147, at 35-37.
231. Id. at 37-38.
232. Id. at 38-42.
233. Id. at 42-43. The CFTC noted, however, instances where a firm could have profited
from the release of information contained in private reports. For example, in August 1982,
Henry Kaufman, chief economist for Phibro-Salomon, Inc., publicly announced his prediction
that "interest rates would fall. The market response was a rapid and strong increase in activity
in interest rate futures trading on the Chicago Board of Trade and the CME. Prior to the
announcement, the firm reportedly purchased several million dollars of futures contracts on
financial instruments. However, no connection between those purchases and the announce-
ment has been demonstrated." Id. (footnote omitted).
234. Id. at 46.
235. Id. at 50.
236. Id. at 58.
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tion about particular issuers comprising the index can be assumed to have
little effect.237 The CFTC noted in this regard that the Commodity Ex-
change Act requires a broad-based index, reflecting the market for all securi-
ties or a substantial segment thereof, to prevent manipulation of the
underlying stocks.2 38 It did not, however, consider the effects of basket trad-
ing or intermarket front-running raised by the subsequent market crash in
October 1987.
The CFTC conducted an additional study to determine the types of re-
strictions placed by cash market firms on their employees' trading. The
study noted a total absence of governmental restrictions or prohibitions on
personal futures trading by those who might possess nonpublic information
of their employers' cash market activities. Nevertheless, the majority (fifty-
three percent) of responding cash market firms indicated that they prohibit
or restrict their officers or employees from trading futures. Forty-seven per-
cent did not do so. 2 3 9
With respect to abuses of fiduciary duty in obtaining inside information,
the CFTC stated that a fiduciary relationship generally arises in futures trad-
ing only in brokerage transactions where an agency relationship exists. A
prime illustration of insider trading in futures involving a breach of fiduciary
duty would be "an agent's trading based on knowledge of the principal's
transactions without the principal's permission. '"2" In this connection, the
CFTC sought better recordkeeping practices for the timing of transactions
by floor brokers for their own accounts while concurrently having knowl-
edge of customer orders they are filling-so-called "dual trading." '241 The
CFTC also considered the concept of "misappropriation" of information in
connection with futures trading. It concluded that the misappropriation the-
ory raised difficult problems of enforcement. For example, it is not always
clear who was injured by such trading; a party that is injured may not even
trade in the futures markets because it is only its cash position that is af-
fected indirectly. Further, claims could be made that persons transacting
business with the insider were harmed because they did not have access to
the nonpublic information.242
237. Id. at 58-59.
238. Id. The SEC had expressed concern that corporate inside information could be used
to trade futures on stock indexes. This, however, did not deter the CFTC, except to the extent
that it reached an agreement with the SEC to resolve differences on sub-index futures, con-
tracts involving more narrowly-based indexes. See Note, supra note 219, at 146 n.134.
239. CFTC INSIDER TRADING REPORT, supra note 147, at 69.
240. Id. at 56.
241. Id. at 9-10, 102-07; see also supra note 185 and accompanying text.
242. CFTC INSIDER TRADING REPORT, supra note 147, at 57; see also supra notes 104-114
and accompanying text.
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The CFTC Insider Trading Report concluded that additional controls
should be placed on employees of contract markets who might have nonpub-
lic information concerning the trading activities of large traders.24 3 With
respect to trading on inside information by others, in particular those associ-
ated with cash markets, the CFTC did not find sufficient evidence to warrant
the development of any recommendations to Congress. It found no signifi-
cant evidence of existing insider trading by employees of firms related to the
cash markets, or firms issuing reports that might affect those markets, or
that limited instances of the practice, to the extent they existed, had harmed
the futures markets.
244
5. CFTC Insider Trading Regulations
Following the issuance of its insider trading report, the CFTC adopted a
new regulation which required self-regulatory organizations in the futures
industry to adopt rules prohibiting trading by their employees in commodity
interests traded on the exchange and in commodities traded on other ex-
changes where the employee, by virtue of his employment, had access to
material nonpublic information concerning the commodity.24 This repre-
sented adoption of limited prohibitions against insider trading, particularly
the use of nonpublic market information by a limited class of persons--ex-
change officials.
In adopting its regulation, the CFTC discarded a prior proposal that
would have imposed prohibitions on governing members of self-regulatory
organizations who possess material nonpublic information.2 46 The formerly
243. CFTC INSIDER TRADING REPORT, supra note 147, at 94-102.
244. Id. at 107.
245. Activities of Self-Regulating Organization Employees Who Possess Material, Non-
public Information, 51 Fed. Reg. 44,866, 44,869 (1986) (codified as amended at 17 C.F.R.
§ 1.59 (1988)) [hereinafter Final Rule].
246. Activities of Self-Regulating Organization Employees Who Possess Material, Non-
public Information, 50 Fed. Reg. 24,533, 24,535-38 (1985) (proposed June 11, 1985) [hereinaf-
ter Proposed Rule]. Previously, in December 1980, the CFTC proposed regulation 1.57 that
would have prohibited contract markets or clearing organization officers or employees from
engaging in commodity futures transactions or investment transactions in actual commodities.
Trading Restrictions Applicable to Certain Contract Market and Clearing Organization Em-
ployees, 45 Fed. Reg. 84,084 (1980) (proposed Dec. 22, 1980). The CFTC later decided not to
adopt that proposal. Restrictions Applicable to Certain Contract Market and Clearing Organ-
ization Employees, 47 Fed. Reg. 7300 (1982) (issued Feb. 18, 1982). Instead, it issued a staff
interpretive statement on the activities of employees of the exchanges. Id. at 7302. The staff
interpretation stated that exchange employees who engaged in market surveillance activities
and had access to confidential information generally should be barred from all commodity
transactions. Id. The self-regulatory organizations, however, took no action in response to
this interpretation. Proposed Rule, supra at 24,536. The CFTC had also previously requested
public comment on contract market rules and practices governing conflicts of interest of mem-
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proposed rule would have prohibited members of an exchange governing
board or committee from engaging in futures trading where they had knowl-
edge of a nonpublic final decision that would alter rules affecting trading in a
futures or options contract, or a reasonable expectation that such a final
decision was imminent. Governing members would also have been prohib-
ited from disclosing information concerning an impending rule change. By
this provision, the CFTC sought to prevent abuse of information concerning
changes in the futures trading environment that might occur through the
exercise of an exchange's emergency authority. Examples of such significant
emergency actions include: revising margin levels; limiting trading to liqui-
dation only; shortening delivery periods; or forcing liquidation of a major
market participant.24 There was, however, considerable opposition to this
proposal because it could impair the ability of knowledgeable members who
were also active traders to serve on self-regulatory organizations' board of
governors or principal committees. In view of this opposition, the CFTC
withdrew the proposal.24 8
Subsequently, the CFTC once again proposed regulations governing trad-
ing by members of the board of governors or principal committees of an
exchange. 249 The CFTC noted that comments on its prior proposal had gen-
erally supported the view that governing members should maintain the con-
fidentiality of information received in the performance of their official
duties.250 The CFTC stated that it found merit in critical comments stating
that formulation of a single uniform standard prohibiting trading by gov-
erning members having knowledge of a final imminent decision of a board or
committee might be impracticable and curtail or inhibit legitimate trading
activities. Instead, the CFTC concluded that a prohibition against the mis-
use of confidential information that does not automatically require gov-
erning members to stop trading in affected contracts would be a more
appropriate regulatory approach.25 ' The CFTC stated that it would allow
self-regulatory organizations, subject to its oversight, to specify the content
of rules proscribing misuse of material nonpublic information by governing
members on a case-by-case basis.252
bers of the governing bodies. Contract Market Rules and Practices Governing Conflicts of
Interest; Request for Public Comment, 47 Fed. Reg. 31,703 (1982) (requested on July 22,
1982).
247. Proposed Rule, supra note 246 at 24,536.
248. Final Rule, supra note 246 at 44,868.
249. Activities of Self-Regulatory Organization Governing Members Who Possess Mate-
rial, Nonpublic Information, 52 Fed. Reg. 32,568 (1987) (proposed Aug. 28, 1987).
250. Id. at 32,569-70.
251. Id. at 32,571.
252. Id.
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Thereafter, the CFTC adopted the proposal. In so doing, it modified an-
other proposal pursuant to which self-regulatory organizations would have
been required to immediately publish decisions that affected particular con-
tracts, so that leaks could not occur. The CFTC dropped this proposal, but
urged self-regulatory organizations to publish as quickly as possible.253
Regulation 1.59, as adopted by the CFTC, defined material information
as:
[I]nformation which, if such information were publicly known,
would be considered important by a reasonable person in deciding
whether to trade a particular commodity interest on a contract
market. As used in this section, "material information" includes,
but is not limited to, information relating to present or anticipated
cash, futures, or option positions, trading strategies, the financial
condition of members of self-regulatory organizations, their cus-
tomers or option customers, or the regulatory actions and pro-
posed regulatory actions of a self-regulatory organization.2 54
The regulation defined "non-public information" as information that has riot
been disseminated "in a manner which makes it generally available to the
trading public through recognized channels of distribution. ' 255 The regula-
tion also applied to "linked" and "related" commodity interests, defined to
include instances where markets were linked with each other or where in-
termarket spread margins or other special margin arrangements between ex-
changes existed.256 It did not, however, appear to apply to securities
exchanges, since they do not have linkages or reciprocal margin arrange-
ments. The rule also contained exemptions allowing for trading: by an em-
ployee in pooled investment vehicles; where a self-regulatory organization
determined that the trading would not be contrary to the purposes of the
regulation, "the Commodity Exchange Act, the public interest or just and
equitable principles of trade.,
25 7
The essential prohibition in regulation 1.59 is:
No employee of a self-regulatory organization may disclose to any
other person any material, non-public information which such em-
ployee obtains as a result of his or her employment at the self-
regulatory organization where such employee has or should have a
253. Activities of Self-Regulatory Organization Governing Members Who Possess Mate-
rial, Nonpublic Information, 52 Fed. Reg. 48,974, 48,976 (1987) (codified at 17 C.F.R.
§ 1.59(c) (1988)) (final rule).
254. 17 C.F.R. § 1.59(a)(3) (1988).
255. Id. § 1.59(a)(4).
256. Id. § 1.59(a)(5), (7). Cross-margining is also being considered for commodity futures
and securities transactions. See SEC REPORT, supra note 3, at 10-57.
257. 17 C.F.R. § 1.59(b)(2)(ii) (1988).
1988]
Catholic University Law Review
reasonable expectation that the information disclosed may assist
another person in trading any commodity interest; Provided, how-
ever, that this provision shall not prohibit disclosures made in the
course of an employee's duties, or disclosures made to another self-
regulatory organization, linked exchange, court of competent juris-
diction or a representative of any agency or department of the fed-
eral or state government acting in his or her official capacity.
258
This regulation, although narrow in its application to employees of self-
regulatory organizations, does deal with some essential issues that must be
faced in crafting any effective regulation on front-running. First, it defines
material information in the context of trading in commodity futures transac-
tions. It also defines nonpublic information. In so doing, the CFTC notably
adopts securities law terminology.259 Second, it recognizes that material
nonpublic information can be used in trading in contracts in related markets,
although it does not specifically extend its reach to the securities industry.
Further, it recognizes that nonpublic material information may be abused, at
least in some contexts. The regulation, therefore, sets the stage for regula-
tion of other traders engaging in abusive practices.
III. INSTITUTIONAL ARBITRAGE AND INTERMARKET FRONT-RUNNING:
NEW CONCERNS AFTER THE CFTC INSIDER TRADING STUDY
In the 1970s, the securities and commodity futures industries slowly began
to become intertwined with each other.2 ' Development of a broad range of
financial futures-type instruments began during this period. 26 1 These invest-
ment vehicles included futures contracts on Government National Mortgage
Association (GNMA) transactions and trading in stock index futures con-
tracts. Index futures featured a unique distinction in relation to traditional
commodities. Index contracts could be settled in cash rather than actual
delivery of the underlying property.26 2
The development of stock index futures contracts coincided with the con-
tinuing growth of institutional trading in the securities markets that had be-
258. Id. § 1.59(b)(1).
259. Proposed Rule, supra note 246 at 24,539.
260. As one congressional report stated: "New investments in commodity futures are com-
ing from the securities markets, attracted by price leverage, low margin requirements, volatile
price action. Less supervised commodity markets sometimes offer attractive speculative op-
portunities to the securities investor." H.R. REP. No. 975, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 39 (1974).
261. Id. at 41-42; S. REP. No. 1131, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 19, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5843.
262. See generally NYSE REPORT, supra note 2; Commodity Futures Trading Commission
Oversight: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Consumer and Monetary Affairs of
the House Comm. on Government Operations, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 536, 553, 567, 580, 601
(1982).
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gun in the 1960s. Such trading culminated, by 1983, in an institutional
trading volume accounting for ninety percent of all securities transac-
tions.2 63 Institutional traders with large portfolios were also interested in
diversifying their portfolios into a broad range of debt instruments and se-
curities that would not be materially impaired if a single investment in a
corporation failed. 264 This diversification, however, exposed the institu-
tional trader to another risk: fluctuations in portfolio value due to funda-
mental economic changes such as interest rates, and variances in the overall
value of equity securities, as represented by the Dow Jones Industrial Aver-
age or other stock indexes. The stock index futures contract and other finan-
cial futures provided a means by which institutional portfolio managers
could protect themselves against these economic risks. Specifically, in a
manner similar to traders in more traditional commodities and securities op-
tions discussed earlier, they could hedge their portfolios through such instru-
ments, which they chose to do on a broad scale.265
Institutional traders also became quite sophisticated in their portfolio
management, to the extent that they developed computer programs to con-
duct their futures trading. Because of the large resources at their disposal,
they also engaged in so-called "market basket" trading, in which the institu-
tion would buy "baskets" of securities that were comprised of, or would
react in the same manner, as the stocks underlying particular stock indexes,
such as the Standard and Poor's Index or the Dow Jones Industrial Aver-
age.2 6' This allowed the institutions to trade their portfolios on the basis of
fundamental economic factors, rather than the performance of a single issue,
a somewhat new concept in securities trading. In addition, "program" trad-
ing allowed the institutions to engage in arbitrage transactions between the
futures markets and the underlying securities markets.2 67 Intermarket arbi-
263. GAO REPORT, supra note 2, at 24-25. Block trading by institutions has also increased
dramatically. In 1970, block transactions accounted for some 15% of the total of share vol-
ume of the NYSE, while in 1986 they constituted almost 50% of volume. BRADY REPORT,
supra note 1, at 11-16; A. Seifert, Overview of Institutional Trading Mechanisms in the Futures
and Securities Markets, (May 1988) (address before the Law & Compliance Division of the
Futures Industry Association in Baltimore, Maryland on May 11-13, 1988, reprinted in Fu-
tures Indus. Assoc. Inc. conference materials); see also Seifert & Turnbull, Institutional Trad-
ing Mechanisms in Futures and Securities, F.I.A. Rev., July/Aug. 1988, at 12 (overview of
institutional trading mechanisms in stock and futures markets).
264. SEC REPORT, supra note 3, at 3-6.
265. Id. at 1-2; see also supra notes 53, 120-24, 147-49, and accompanying text (discussing
hedging in securities options and commodities markets).
266. SEC REPORT, supra note 3, at 3-2 to 3-3. Market basket trading now accounts for
some 25% of institutional transactions. Id.
267. See generally Hazen, Volatility and Market Inefficiency: A Commentary on the Effects
of Options, Futures, and Risk Arbitrage on the Stock Market, 44 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 789
(1987) (studying the effects of index-trading on the securities markets); SECURITIES AND Ex-
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trage trading involved sales of futures contracts by institutions when the un-
derlying securities were priced higher than the futures contract or, vice
versa, the purchase of stock when the futures contract was selling higher.
This practice had the helpful effect of keeping the market prices aligned, but
it also led to disruptions during the "triple-witching" hour when options and
futures contracts expired at the same time. This problem, however, was re-
solved by the regulators through staggered expiration times.268
Prior to the October 1987 market crash, there were other warning signals.
The NYSE asserted that program trading could lead to a "meltdown" of the
exchange if program traders all began selling simultaneously. 269 A "cas-
cade" scenario also surfaced, which posited that index arbitrage trading
could lead to successively lower levels of prices in securities until the market
had completely collapsed.270 These concerns, however, did not reach promi-
nence until the October 1987 market crash.
After the crash, a presidential task force found that the heavy volume of
trading during October was fueled in large measure by institutional traders
engaged in program trading. 271 For example, between 11:40 a.m. and 2:00
p.m. on October 19, portfolio insurers sold approximately 10,000 contracts
in the futures market, the equivalent of $1.3 billion in stocks. 2  This repre-
sented forty-one percent of all futures volume. These portfolio insurers also
sold stock worth $900 million on the NYSE during this period. In fact,
stock and futures market portfolio insurers contributed over $3.7 billion in
selling pressure by early afternoon on October 19, when the market plunged
a record 500 points. Indeed, one institution sold thirteen baskets of stock on
October 19 worth just under $100 million.273 It was forced to discontinue its
program when the market began to collapse. But other portfolio insurers
sold over 6,000 futures contracts-the equivalent of $660 million worth of
stock. These portfolio insurers comprised only a small group of traders.
The top four sellers accounted for $2.85 billion or fourteen percent of total
CHANGE COMMISSION, ROUNDTABLE ON INDEXED ARBITRAGE, JULY 1986 BACKGROUND
MATERIALS; THE IMPACT OF DERIVATIVE INDEX TRADING ON THE SECURITIES MARKETS
(remarks of David S. Ruder, Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission before the
Bond Club of Chicago on Oct. 6, 1987); DIVISION OF MARKET REGULATION, SECURITIES
AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, THE ROLE OF INDEX-RELATED TRADING IN THE MARKET
DECLINE ON SEPTEMBER 11 AND 12, 1986 6 (Mar. 1987).
268. SEC REPORT, supra note 3, at 1-8; NYSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 212-22.
269. Mayer, Some Watchdog! How the SEC Helped Set the Stage for Black Monday, Bar-
ron's, Dec. 28, 1987, at 18.
270. GAO REPORT, supra note 2, at 31. The CFTC, however, has rejected any such cas-
cade scenario. See CFTC FINAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 22-23.
271. BRADY REPORT, supra note 1, at 34.
272. Id.
273. Id.
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sales on the futures side and three portfolio insurers traded just under $2
billion worth of stock on the securities side.274
In its report on the stock market crash of 1987, the SEC examined in-
stances of firms trading in the futures market ahead of customer activity in
the securities market. The SEC focused on firm activity at the opening on
October 19 and October 20 to determine whether firms were selling futures
based on knowledge of large institutional stock orders they were attempting
to execute on the opening. The SEC Report found a few troubling trading
activities, leading it to recommend that this type of activity, which may dis-
advantage customer orders, be more thoroughly reviewed.275
The SEC also reviewed trading to determine if brokers or others were
trading in the futures markets ahead of market basket transactions on the
NYSE. The SEC noted in this regard that it had previously examined front-
running in connection with the triple witching hour. 27 6 At that time, it con-
sidered whether a single firm might be aware of a large number of customer
arbitrage programs that needed to be closed out before the opening.277 The
SEC was concerned that this situation could have occurred at the opening of
the NYSE on October 19 and 20, when firms learned of massive imbalances
in customer sell orders on October 19 and customer buy orders on October
20.278 The SEC surveyed the firms' proprietary activity at the opening on
October 19 and 20 to determine whether firms may have sold futures on
October 19 or bought futures on October 20 based on the knowledge of large
institutional stock orders they were attempting to execute at the opening. It
was this investigation that raised the most troubling questions for the SEC.
Specifically, it found that thirteen firms included in its survey had sold 771
futures contracts between 9:30 and 10:00 o'clock on October 19, before most
of the component stocks' proprietary selling activity. 9 Similarly, on Octo-
274. Id. at 36.
275. SEC REPORT, supra note 3, at 3-31 to 3-32. The SEC noted that, while further inquir-
ies appeared justified in those few troubling instances, most of the trades reported for CME
member firms did not support the conclusion that portfolio insurance vendors or brokers
traded ahead of customer orders. I. at 3-31.
A principal concern arising out of the stock market crash involved so-called intermarket
front-running, not just trading ahead of customer orders. As one newspaper report noted:
"Intermarket front-running describes the practice of using inside information about impending
market-moving stock transactions to trade ahead in stock-related futures. Some on Wall Street
allege, without offering details, that knowledge of customers' big orders is sometimes used to
do just that." SEC Splits in 3-2 Vote Over the Nature of a Brokerage Firm's Duties to Clients,
Wall St. J., July 11, 1988, at 27, col. 4; see also CME Defines Front-Running, J. Comm., May
23, 1988, at 6A, col. 3.
276. SEC REPORT, supra note 3, at 3-31 to 3-32.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 3-32.
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ber 20, these thirteen firms purchased 484 futures contracts between 9:30
and 10:00 o'clock, with three firms accounting for seventy-four percent of
that buying activity.
2 81
The SEC noted that this activity was not classic front-running because
there were many indicators, in addition to a firm's particular customer or-
ders, suggesting that the market would open unusually low on October 19 or
higher on October 20.281 Nevertheless, it found that these trading activities
contributed to the increase in the futures discount to the stock market on
October 19 and to a premium between the markets on October 20.282 It also
contributed to delayed openings and customers receiving executions at lower
prices on October 19 and higher prices on October 20 than might otherwise
have occurred. The SEC Report concluded that proprietary trading by firms
at the opening in the derivative markets could disadvantage customer orders
and that this should be thoroughly reviewed.283 It also noted that "ques-
tions had been raised, which [the SEC] was continuing to review, concerning
firms buying futures on October 20 in anticipation of announcements of cor-
porate customer buy-back activity."'2 84 Subsequently, as the result of the
SEC's report, and after conducting its own review, the NYSE announced
that it was considering the adoption of an interpretation "whereby trading in
index futures immediately prior to and with knowledge of the execution of
one or more baskets of stock that favorably impact the value of the underly-
ing index could constitute front-running and, thus, be a violation of just and
equitable principles of trade.
' 2 81
The CFTC Final Report on the stock market crash of 1987 also consid-
ered front-running.2 6 The CFTC stated that it was only in recent years that
the concept has had any application in the futures markets. According to
the CFTC, front-running historically referred to the use of information con-
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Id. During the October market crisis, futures stock index contracts often traded at a
discount or a premium compared to the stocks underlying the index because execution delays
and uncertainty as to whether stocks were open for trading on the NYSE precluded effective
arbitrage. See CFTC FINAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 22-23.
283. SEC REPORT, supra note 3, at 3-32.
284. Id. at 3-32, 3-33 & n.85. The corporate buy-back activity arose when several corpora-
tions began purchasing back their own stock to take advantage of favorable prices caused by
the drastic market decline in October. It was thought that this effectively rallied the market.
Id. at 6-10.
285. Donald J. Solodar, New York Stock Exchange Information Memo (Apr. 13, 1988)
(Mr. Solodar is Senior Vice President of the NYSE). Interestingly, the CME has stated that it
supports the NYSE's position that intermarket front-running from stock to futures exchanges
violates its rules. CME Supports NYSE Position on Front-Running Ban, Reuter Bus. Rep.,
Apr. 5, 1988.
286. CFTC FINAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 199-200.
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cerning securities or securities options on large block orders relating to trad-
ing in the options and stock markets, rather than the futures markets. The
CFTC stated in its opinion that the antifraud provisions of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and the Commodity Exchange Act may apply to par-
ticular instances of front-running, which it did not identify, but pointed out
that neither statutory scheme specifically addresses the practice.2"7 It noted
that the rules of the securities and futures exchanges also did not specifically
address intermarket front-running, although, as discussed below, the com-
modities exchanges have taken the position that such conduct violates their
general prohibitions against conduct inconsistent with just and equitable
principles of trade.28
The CFTC Final Report stated that no allegations of front-running in-
volving trading in stock index futures or options on futures during 1987 had
been brought to the attention of its staff. Further, the report stated that
what constitutes front-running under a particular set of circumstances is not
always clear. It noted that the SEC had conceded that the "line which sepa-
rates appropriate hedging and other legitimate activity and front-running is
not always clear," and the CFTC asserted that it could find no cases brought
by the SEC charging front-running under rule 10b-5.289 The CFTC Final
Report also noted a paucity of disciplinary actions on the securities side in-
volving front-running and that those few that had been brought involved
front-running of customer orders in favor of proprietary accounts. The
CFTC stated that it was continuing to consider the issue and that it sought
to establish methods for identifying potential intermarket front-running
trading patterns.29° It acknowledged the need for a mechanism for timely
communication of market surveillance data revealing possible front-running
among all exchanges with common self-regulatory interests. It further con-
cluded that the Intermarket Surveillance Group was an appropriate forum
for facilitating necessary communication of such market surveillance
data.291 It noted that the Intermarket Surveillance Group was considering
the manner in which futures exchanges could be included more formally in
its deliberations. The CFTC expressed the view that formal recognition of
the futures exchanges by the Group would contribute significantly to ad-
dressing common surveillance concerns. The CFTC staff is also currently
considering the advisability of a "regulation establishing a minimum futures
industry standard for the prohibition of front-running activity involving
287. Id. at 198.
288. Id. at 198-99.
289. Id. at 198.
290. Id. at 199-200.
291. Id. at 200; see also supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
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transactions on futures exchanges. 2 92
Even before the market crash in October 1987, various commodity futures
exchanges had responded to inquiries made by the CFTC on front-running
and whether their rules would proscribe such activity. In a letter dated
April 6, 1987, the Chicago Board of Trade noted that the rules of the securi-
ties and options exchanges did not specifically address front-running, and
neither did its own rules. 293 The Chicago Board of Trade stated, however,
that a number of its rules could be applicable "depending upon the facts of
the particular situation, in which, if circumstances warranted, the exchange
would apply to member firms engaging in strategies abusive of the mar-
kets."'2 94 This included rules prohibiting conduct inconsistent with "just
and equitable principles of trade," or activities that result in the demoraliza-
tion of the market or acts detrimental to the welfare of the exchange.
295
The New York Futures Exchange (NYFE) advised the CFTC that it was
monitoring the activity of member firms to determine whether front-running
had occurred.296 In one case, concern was apparently expressed as to in-
termarket front-running, and the NYFE informed the CFTC that it would
investigate that particular activity to determine whether it constituted prear-
ranged trading, manipulation, or conduct inconsistent with just and equita-
ble principles of trade. It also noted that it was conducting its investigation
jointly with the NYSE.29 7
The Kansas City Board of Trade advised the CFTC that it had no specific
prohibition against front-running but that it believed that front-running was
a possible violation of the Board's rule against detrimental acts against the
exchange and a general rule against other prohibited activities and manipu-
lation.298 It noted that, to conduct a successful investigation concerning
front-running, it would require cooperation from the options and stock mar-
kets. Significantly, it viewed as objectionable the related transactions be-
tween the markets made for the account of a member of the exchange.299 It
asserted that it did not believe that members should bear liability for non-
292. Id.
293. Letter from Frederick J. Grede, Vice President, Administration and Planning, Chi-
cago Board of Trade, to Andrea M. Corcoran, Director of CFTC, Division of Trading and
Markets 1 (Apr. 6, 1987).
294. Id.
295. Id. at 1-2.
296. Letter from Jill S. Fessler, Enforcement Counsel, New York Futures Exchange, Inc.,
to Alan A. Seifert, Deputy Director, CFTC, Division of Trading and Markets 1 (May 1, 1987).
297. Id. at 2.
298. Letter from Michael Braude, President, Kansas City Board of Trade to Alan A. Sei-
fert, Deputy Director, CFTC, Division of Trading and Markets (May 7, 1987).
299. Id.
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member trades executed at the exchange or related trades on options and
stock markets.3°
The Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) advised the CFTC that its sur-
veillance staff had worked with the NYSE staff since at least December of
1986 to ascertain the identity of major stock purchasers and sellers at and
just prior to the expiration of trading in December 1986 index contracts."01
The CME then conducted an investigation in connection with arbitrage
activity of those traders.3 °2 It noted that it encountered difficulty in its in-
vestigation because it had not received all the information requested of one
of the traders. 3  Its survey also focused on whether a particular trader had
traded ahead of its customers' stock orders using the futures markets. This
was discussed with the NYSE surveillance staff as a part of a joint
investigation.3°
The CME noted that its rules prohibit a member from trading for its own
account ahead of customer orders and ban trading of a derivative option
when the member has customer orders for futures contracts and vice versa,
until the customer orders are executed. 0 5 It need not be shown that the
customer was harmed in order for a violation of these rules to exist. The
CME said that a member's misuse of its knowledge of a customer order for
another market by trading ahead of that order at the exchange would consti-
tute bad faith, dishonest conduct and/or conduct detrimental to the ex-
change in violation of exchange rules.306 The exchange stated that it would
accordingly prosecute any firm engaging in this activity.30 7 The CME, in
conjunction with the NYSE, has since adopted an interpretation prohibiting
intermarket front-running, which declares that certain transactions by those
trading on their own or customer accounts with material, non-public infor-
mation may violate exchange rules. 308 Transactions covered by the interpre-
tation include trading in stock index futures contracts or options with
knowledge of an imminent stock program transaction by another, and, con-
versely, stock program transactions with knowledge of the imminent execu-
300. Id.
301. Letter from Gerald D. Beyer, Senior Vice President, Legal and Regulatory Affairs,
CME, to Andrea Corcoran, CFTC, Division of Trading and Markets 1 (Apr. 15, 1987).
302. Id.
303. Id. at 2.
304. Id.
305. Id. at 3.
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. Chicago Mercantile Exchange/New York Stock Exchange Intermarket Trading Re-
strictions, Submission No. 88-54 (Sept. 1, 1988) [hereinafter Intermarket Trading Restric-
tions]; see also CME Defines Front-Running, J. Comm., May 23, 1988, at 6A, col. 3.
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tion of another's orders in stock index futures or options.3°9 The policy
states explicity that it is unnecessary for the CME to demonstrate that an-
other has been disadvantaged in order to find a violation of rules requiring
just and equitable trading practices.310 Further, it states that front-running
may violate just and equitable principles of trade regardless of whether the
source of the material, non-public information gave permission for such
trading.3 ' The CME, however, took pains to clarify that its new policy
does not extend to legitimate hedging strategies:
[N]othing herein shall prevent such member or person from estab-
lishing, in a futures market, a bona fide hedge of risk such member
or person may have assumed or agreed to assume in facilitating the
execution of any other person's stock program orders. In addition,
nothing herein shall prevent a member or person associated with a
member organization from implementing a proprietary market
strategy involving a stock program and a related stock index fu-
tures transaction by executing the stock index futures trade(s)
prior to the execution of the stock program.31 2
Nevertheless, the policy attempts to delineate the limits of permissible hedg-
ing, noting that "if a member or person [associated with a member] executes
or causes to be executed a transaction in one market to take advantage of
such member's or person's imminent transaction in a related market, that
member or person may be engaging in manipulative activity.', 3
Consequently, it now appears that the futures exchanges are taking the
same view as the securities exchanges on front-running practices, other than
self-front-running. Such front-running constitutes a violation of the general
principles of equitable conduct governing trading on those exchanges. Mem-
bers engaging in such violations may, therefore, be disciplined by the ex-
change. These exchange rules, however, do not provide for a private right of
action for someone injured by this activity. More importantly, they do not
apply to individuals who are not members of the particular exchanges where
the activity occurs. Accordingly, there is a gap in the regulatory framework
and federal regulation may be necessary.
309. Intermarket Trading Restrictions, supra note 308.
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. Id.
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IV. CONTROLLING IMPROPER FRONT-RUNNING:
A PROPOSAL FOR REFORM
A. Clarify Authority of the CFTC to Prohibit Fraudulent and
Manipulative Practices
In all likelihood, the CFTC will not retreat from its position that market
users should be able to hedge their positions on the futures markets by, for
example, selling futures contracts before effectuating large block transac-
tions. This is a fundamental purpose of the Commodity Exchange Act and
transactions of this nature depend on use of the hedging function.314 Since
the Commodity Exchange Act was adopted on the premise that such hedg-
ing should be permitted,315 and since it is a principal reason why futures
contracts are allowed to exist at all,316 it does not seem likely that front-
running of this nature would or should be proscribed.
On the other hand, persons front-running on the basis of nonpublic infor-
mation concerning the activities of hedgers or cash traders have a much re-
duced claim of legitimacy. These persons may bring information of an
impending sale into the marketplace. In so doing, they injure the large
trader selling the block by depressing prices in advance. In such cases, it
might be claimed that they misappropriate information of the trader, as in
Carpenter v. United States.317 In other cases that lack the specific element of
misappropriation (e.g., front-running by a tippee of a cash market dealer),
the front-running trader obtains an advantage over other traders on the basis
of material, nonpublic information. In other words, such a trader tilts an
otherwise level playing field because of his pipeline to a source of informa-
tion, the willing tippor. In contrast to a Dirks v. SEC 318 type of adviser or
other persons who ferret out market information through their own efforts
and resources, the willing tippor and front-running tippee stand in an oppor-
314. Eg., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 358 (1982);
S. REP. No. 1131, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 18-20, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 5843, 5858-61; 132 CONG. REC. S1720 (daily ed. Oct. 17, 1986) (statement of Mr.
Zorinsky); 132 CONG. REC. H10,1 14 (daily ed. Oct. 15, 1986) (statement of Rep. Coleman);
German Judgments Holding that Futures Contracts Trading on United States Exchanges Con-
stitute Gaming Instruments [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 23,419
(Nov. 25, 1986) [hereinafter Gaming Instruments]. See generally 7 U.S.C. § 5 (1982) (hedging
offers protection against possible losses to those engaged in the business of the underlying
commodity).
315. 7 U.S.C. § 5.
316. See generally Gaming Instruments, supra note 308 (futures speculators provide liquid-
ity needed by cash market participants to hedge against adverse price fluctuations).
317. 108 S. Ct. 316 (1987).
318. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
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tunistic relationship, sharing advantageous information unavailable through
legitimate channels to even the most diligent traders and advisors.
The CFTC may have the power to broadly interpret its statute in enforce-
ment cases or to adopt rules necessary specifically to prohibit undesirable
front-running practices. It may be more appropriate, however, to seek ex-
press authority from Congress in view of the fact that such a rule may be
quite controversial and the courts may be reluctant to recognize such sweep-
ing agency enforcement powers, possibly finding that the agency lacks au-
thority to adopt such a rule under existing statutes.319
Various bills have been introduced that would curb front-running in one
form or another. For example, H.R. 251, a bill introduced by Representa-
tive Neal Smith, tracks the provision he sought to introduce in 1982. This
bill would prohibit insiders from trading on material information "about
present or anticipated cash or futures trading.., to which such individual is
not a party," where the amounts involved exceed a specified minimum.
320
In another bill, Representative Smith would prohibit traders executing or-
ders for any other person from holding any beneficial interest in stock index
futures contracts.3 21 A Senate bill would create an intermarket coordinating
committee composed of the CFTC, the SEC and the Federal Reserve Board.
Among other things, the committee would be directed to improve in-
termarket cooperation and improve information systems and methods for
319. See Stoller v. CFTC, 834 F.2d 262 (2d Cir. 1987) (absence of adequate prior notice of
new CFTC interpretation constituted incurable defect in proceedings); Palmer Trading Co.,
Inc. v. Shearson Hayden Stone Inc., [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH)
20,900 (N.D. Ill. 1979) (CFTC exceeded authority in adopting antifraud rule for foreign
futures contracts). But see First Commodity Corp. v. CFTC, 676 F.2d 1 (Ist Cir. 1982) (up-
holding CFTC authority to impose liability for fraud in foreign futures transactions even ab-
sent actual intent to deceive or misrepresent); Kleinberg v. Bear, Steams & Co., [1984-1986
Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 22,613 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). To the extent that it
is claimed that front-running is a manipulative practice, Congress previously rejected an effort
to allow the Commodity Exchange Authority, the CFTC predecessor, to define manipulation
under the Commodity Exchange Act. See Report of the Administrator of the Commodity
Exchange Authority 9-10 (1949) (cited in 2 L. Loss, supra note 127, at 1168 n.10). This may
suggest that the agency does not have such general rulemaking authority and that curtailment
of improper front-running should be attempted on a case-by-case basis. As to the effect of
congressional interpretations of statutes and the effect of amendments that are not passed, see
Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16 (1983); Bell v. New Jersey, 461 U.S. 773 (1983); Univer-
sities Research Ass'n v. Coutu, 450 U.S. 754 (1981); Andrus v. Shell Oil Co., 446 U.S. 657
(1980); SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103, 119-23 (1977); Mayburg v. Secretary of Health & Human
Servs., 740 F.2d 100, 104-05 (1st Cir. 1984); Office of Communication of United Church of
Christ v. FCC, 707 F.2d 1413 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
320. H.R. 251, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987). In another bill introduced by Representative
Neal Smith, persons exporting grains would be required to report their sales to the CFTC, an
apparent repetition of his earlier legislation. See H.R. 250, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
321. H.R. 1487, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
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detecting front-running.322
Legislation, however, might be more effective if it afforded the CFTC
broad and flexible authority to promulgate rules that better define fraudulent
or manipulative acts. Under such authority, the CFTC could adopt a regu-
lation defining front-running and other similar activities and prohibit such
activities as fraudulent or manipulative practices in violation of the Com-
modity Exchange Act. This would allow the CFTC to more broadly pro-
scribe practices that do not meet its presently uncertain manipulation
definition, but which may have undue and adverse effects upon the market,
whatever the motives of the traders involved.32 a
Such a proscription could be worded as follows: "The Commission may
adopt such rules and regulations as are necessary to implement the provi-
sions of section 4(b) and section 9(b) of this Act, including rules and regula-
322. S. 2256, 100th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1988). In testimony before Congress by various se-
curities industry officials, it was stated that "brokerage firms should be required to disclose
more information on their institutional customers' trading activities as a means of curbing
intermarket front-running." Brokers Should Disclose More Data to Stop Front-Running, Sen-
ate Panel Told, DAILY REPORT FOR EXECUTIVES, (BNA) No. 77, at A-4 (Apr. 21, 1988).
Those firms stated that "intermarket front-running may be costing institutional and individual
investors billions of dollars in hidden costs," id., but they declined to forego their investment
banking activities to stop front-running. A member of the Presidential Task Force that filed
the Brady Report, supra note 1, also stated that finding front-running was comparable to locat-
ing the Loch Ness Monster or Big Foot: "All three are widespread topics of conversation and
are passionately believed to exist by a segment of the population. However, in no case does
there exist an accumulation of hard evidence of proof [of] the case." SIA Proposed Inter-
market Council Composed of Futures, Securities SROs, 50 BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS,
BANKING REPORT, 724 (Apr. 25, 1988); Dingell Launches Investigation of Short Selling, Front-
Running, Securities Week, Mar. 14, 1988, at 3.
323. This form of legislation would afford the CFTC flexibility to proscribe additional ma-
nipulative and fraudulent activity, some of which is related to front-running. For example, the
SEC OPTIONS STUDY, supra note 11," noted another practice related to front-running known
as "tape racing." Id. at 189. This involves "trading of options based on last sale information
regarding the underlying stock" prior to the dissemination of the information to the general
public. Id. Tape racing was possible because of inefficiencies in systems by which information
regarding executed trades was reported off the floors of the exchange. Persons observing the
trades on the floor of the stock exchange were, therefore, "able to transmit options orders
reflecting that information to the floors of the option exchanges and have such orders executed
at favorable prices prior to the availability of the last sale information" to the general public.
Id. The SEC found that the practice was largely eliminated by expediting the entry of transac-
tion information into their reporting system. Id.
During the stock market crash of 1987, opportunity presented itself for tape racing. Trading
delays on the NYSE in particular stocks, and overloaded order entry and execution systems
resulted in confusion and delays in reporting information off the floor of the NYSE. As a
consequence, price disparities developed between the two marketplaces, presenting opportuni-
ties for persons on the floor of the NYSE to utilize their position and more current information
to advantageously trade futures. To date, no such abuses have been uncovered, but the poten-
tial nonetheless existed. See CFTC FINAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 22-23.
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tions that proscribe particular practices as being manipulative or fraudulent
or having the effect of being manipulative or fraudulent."
A CFTC regulation promulgated pursuant to such statutory authority to
proscribe front-running could take the following form:
PROHIBITED MANIPULATIVE FRAUDULENT
PRACTICES
(a) Front-running as defined herein shall constitute a manipulative
and fraudulent practice in violation of sections 4(b) and 9(b) of
the Commodity Exchange Act.
(b) Material information is information which, if publicly known,
would be considered important by a reasonable person in de-
ciding whether to trade a particular commodity interest on a
contract market. As used in this section, material information
includes, but is not limited to, information relating to present
or anticipated cash, futures, or option positions or trading
strategies.
(c) Nonpublic information is information that has not been dis-
seminated in a manner which makes it generally available to
the trading public through recognized channels of distribution.
(d) Front-running is the practice of trading in commodity futures
or options contracts with advance knowledge of material non-
public information about the cash, options, or futures market
activities of any dealer, processor, user or consumer of a com-
modity or customer of the acting party where such activities
could reasonably be foreseen to affect market prices and where
the information is obtained by the acting party through em-
ployment with such persons or through any confidential, fidu-
ciary or any other such special relationship with such persons.
This proscription is worded in such a way as to allow investment advisors
or other persons trading on fundamentals to acquire such information freely
in the same way as the advisor did in the Dirks v. SEC case.324 It would,
however, prevent an employee or someone having a special relationship from
providing access to material nonpublic information and obtaining a trading
advantage over other traders to the possible detriment of the cash trader. In
other words, while this provision would outlaw truly inside "tippee" and
"trading ahead" transactions, it would allow hedging and legitimate price
discovery activities to proceed unfettered.
B. Improve Systematic Intermarket Surveillance
Effective prohibitions on improper front-running represent only part of
324. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
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the solution. To regulate front-running effectively, it must be identified as
well as proscribed. This will require expanded intermarket surveillance ef-
forts. Presently, the SEC has in place a sophisticated system of following
individual stock prices to determine whether inside trading or front-running
in option contracts on individual securities has occurred. 32 5 The SEC and
the self-regulatory organizations such as the NASD and the securities ex-
changes follow stock prices closely.326 If abnormal trading or sharp fluctua-
tions occur, as in the case of a large block sale, the SEC and the exchanges
can investigate to determine who was trading and for what reasons. This is
often a long and involved process, but effective in uncovering instances of
insider trading. The SEC, however, does not appear to have any analogous
method to determine if front-running is occurring in stock index option con-
tracts, and it is certainly unable to determine whether it is occurring in stock
index futures contracts. This is the case with stock option contracts because
in the past the SEC has been unable to determine promptly who engaged in
basket trading at any particular time. This deficiency is being corrected so
that the SEC can examine the basket traders and also look at stock option
index activity to determine whether there is any correlation.327 From there
the SEC can proceed as it has in traditional insider trading cases. A more
effective reporting system such as that similar to the CFTC's, however,
could provide more effective surveillance.
The SEC surveillance system differs somewhat from that of the CFTC.
The CFTC requires all large traders to file a Form 40, that describes who the
traders are, when they initially reach a reportable level in a commodity.328
A reporting level simply means that the trader has purchased or sold enough
commodity futures contracts for the CFTC to deem its activities significant.
In fact, the trading levels are reasonably low and, therefore, the reports af-
ford the CFTC information regarding broad computerized access to who is
325. Macey & Haddock, Shirking at the SEC: The Failure of the National Market System,
1985 U. ILL. L. REV. 315, 345-46.
326. As noted above, see supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text, self-regulatory organi-
zations in the securities industry have developed an Intermarket Surveillance Group to which
all securities and securities option exchanges are members and which closely follows front-
running issues; see also SEC REPORT, supra note 3, at 3-33. The Intermarket Surveillance
Group is apparently being expanded to include commodity futures exchanges. See CFTC,
SEC and Exchanges Meet to Discuss Sharing Surveillance Information, See. Week, Mar. 21,
1988, at 7; see also CFTC Chairman Questions SEC Conclusions About Front-Running, Sec.
Week, Mar. 21, 1988, at 8. The Intermarket Surveillance Group is forming a subcommittee to
develop a definition of front-running that will apply to all markets. ISG Members Appoint
Group to Help Define Intermarket Front-Running, Sec. Week, Apr. 11, 1988, at 4.
327. See generally SEC REPORT, supra note 3, at 3-33.
328. 17 C.F.R. § 18.04 (1988).
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trading and for what reasons. 329 A trader's broker must also file another
report for each day the trader remains at reportable levels. 330 This report
tells the CFTC the magnitude of futures trading being conducted by that
trader. Because this system is computerized, it allows the CFTC to rapidly
review those traders in the market. By integrating this system with that of
the SEC, an effective market surveillance system could be readily imple-
mented. The CFTC, however, does not presently follow short term trading
fluctuations in the same manner as the SEC. Rather, the CFTC generally
concentrates its surveillance upon trading activities occurring as a contract
approaches expiration. This is because it is in the delivery period of con-
tracts that most manipulations and problems take place. At such times, the
CFTC heightens its surveillance to assure that there are sufficient supplies on
hand to meet delivery requirements. It seeks to avoid a squeeze or a market
default.33 l
Consequently, front-running activities prior to an approaching delivery
period may go undetected, or at least the CFTC's surveillance mechanisms
are not directed at promptly identifying them. Therefore, in order to deter-
mine whether front-running is occurring, the CFTC must focus more on
short turn trading prior to delivery periods and it must share its data with
that of the securities exchanges and the SEC. By comparing the data, both
agencies can determine whether futures market activities on the futures ex-
changes preceded block transactions. If so, they can then determine who the
traders were and see if there were any connections between the traders and,
if so, whether the activities were legitimate hedging activities. If not, they
can focus on the traders involved to determine whether they gained access to
material nonpublic information and, it so, can then prosecute them.332
V. CONCLUSION
Trading on material non-public information on options and futures mar-
329. See id. § 15.03. The reporting level for the Standard & Poor's 500 stock index con-
tract is 300 contracts and for the Value Line Average Index it is 100 contracts. Id.
330. Id. § 17.00-.02.
331. The CFTC asserts that its daily market surveillance program includes daily monitor-
ing of all active futures and option contracts, the activity of large traders, key cash futures
market price relationships and relevant supply and demand factors. J. MARKHAM, THE HIs-
TORY OF COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING AND ITS REGULATION, 134-36 (1987); CFTC,
1983 ANNUAL REPORT 57. Nevertheless, its focus traditionally has been on problems in expir-
ing futures contracts or large scale, long term position trading. See generally id. at 58; CFTC,
1985 ANNUAL REPORT 48; CFTC, 1982 ANNUAL REPORT 64-66; CFTC, 1980 ANNUAL RE-
PORT 66-71; CFTC, 1979 ANNUAL REPORT 53-54.
332. See generally Brokers Should Disclose More Data to Stop Front-Running, Senate Panel
Told, BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, DAILY REPORT FOR EXECUTIVES, (BNA) No. 77
(Apr. 21 1988).
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kets raises more sophisticated concerns than more infamous insider trading
in securities. Presently, neither the SEC nor the CFTC has effective prohibi-
tions against front-running activities in place. The SEC's permissible appli-
cation of its insider trading standard to front-running may be too narrow to
effectively prohibit this activity. At the present time, the SEC has chosen to
rely upon circulars issued by the self-regulatory organizations which state
that such front-running activities violate exchange rules.3 33 As noted above,
however, the exchanges can only apply their rules to their members and,
therefore, nonmember traders may escape the prohibition.
Similarly, the CFTC does not appear presently to have sufficient statutory
authority to proscribe front-running. It also evinces an apparent unwilling-
ness to do so. Therefore, statutory changes may be necessary both in the
SEC and the CFTC areas if this practice is to be prevented.
CFTC's current reluctance to regulate in this area results from its desire
to preserve the traditional conceptual distinctions between insider trading in
securities and futures industries. It also appears to be dissuaded by the diffi-
culty in detecting front-running activity, even to the point of questioning
whether harmful front-running practices are occuring. The solution pro-
posed by this Article addresses both problems. It insures that traditionally
acceptable hedging activities will remain inviolate, by carefully excluding
such practices from the regulatory definition of front-running, and, in the
final analysis, by affording CFTC broad statutory authority to determine
what constitutes fraud and manipulation. This flexible authority could be
excercised as sparingly and precisely as warranted by circumstances. With
regard to the elusiveness of front-running, the proposed improvements in
surveillence methodology should allow proscribed practices to be detected
more readily.
Finally, to the extent that specific individuals are harmed by improper
front-running, bringing the practice under the aegis of section nine of the
Commodity Exchange Act would afford aggrieved parties potent remedies
under the express private right of action available for violations of that
section.
333. Most recently, the NYSE adopted and filed with the SEC a proposed exchange rule
defining and banning intermarket front-running. Securities Exchange Act No. 26,279, 53 Fed.
Reg. 46,731 (Nov. 18, 1988); see Big Board Proposes Ban on Intermarket Front-Running, Wall
St. J., Nov. 17, 1988, at C21, col. 1.
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